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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to compare the cyclical behavior of various credit impairment 
accounting regimes, namely IAS 39, IFRS 9 and US GAAP. We model the impact of credit 
impairments on the Prot and Loss (P&L) account under all three regimes. Our results 
suggest that although IFRS 9 is less procyclical than the previous regulation (IAS 39), it is 
more procyclical than US GAAP because it merely requests to provision the expected loss 
of one year under Stage 1 (initial category). Instead, since US GAAP prescribes that lifetime 
expected losses are fully provisioned at inception, the amount of new loans originated is 
negatively correlated with realized losses. This leads to relatively higher (lower) provisions 
during the upswing (downswing) phase of the financial cycle. Nevertheless, the lower 
procyclicality of US GAAP seems to come at cost of a large increase in provisions.
Keywords: banking system, provisions, regulation, cyclicality.
JEL classification: G21, G28, K20.
Resumen
Este artículo pretende comparar el comportamiento cíclico del provisionamiento para riesgo 
de crédito bajo varios regímenes contables, en particular IAS 39, IFRS 9 y US GAAP. 
Modelizamos el impacto del deterioro crediticio en la cuenta de pérdidas y ganancias en 
los tres casos. Nuestros resultados sugieren que IFRS 9 es menos procíclico que su antecesor 
(IAS 39) pero más procíclico que US GAAP, puesto que requiere provisionar el crédito 
no deteriorado (Stage 1) únicamente a un año vista. En contraste, bajo US GAAP las 
pérdidas para toda la vida del crédito se provisionan en origen, lo que hace que el volumen 
de nuevo crédito y las pérdidas incurridas estén negativamente correlacionadas. Lo 
anterior conduce a provisiones relativamente mayores (menores) durante las fases 
expansivas (contractivas) del ciclo fi nanciero. En todo caso, la menor prociclicidad de 
US GAAP se alcanza a costa de un aumento considerable de las provisiones.
Palabras clave: sistema bancario, provisiones, regulación, prociclicidad.
Códigos JEL: G21, G28, K20.
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Non-technical summary
The purpose of this paper is to present an assessment of the cyclical implications of various
accounting regimes for credit instruments. We elaborate on the recent evolution of account-
ing standards, namely International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39), International Financial
Reporting Standards 9 (IFRS 9) and the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US
GAAP). The latter two have implied a shift from the incurred loss to the expected loss paradigm.
The different approaches followed have a significant impact on the timing with which credit
losses are recognized in the profit and loss account (P&L), thus potentially hampering hamper
a financial institution s viability and credit supply. IFRS 9 recognizes the expected credit loss
(ECL) based on the degree of credit deterioration (one year for Stage 1 and lifetime expected loss
for Stages 2 and 3); under US GAAP, since for each loan the provisions made at the origination
date account for its lifetime ECL, overall provisions tend to increase with the flow of newly
originated loans, ceteris paribus. Given that the latter is negatively correlated with default
rates, two opposite effects influence the dynamics of provisions: on the one hand, a higher new
loans origination rate tends to increase provisioning during the credit cycle s boom phases (and
vice versa during crises); on the other hand, it is possible that lifetime ECL be underestimated
during credit booms, leading to insufficient provisioning at inception and therefore to subse-
quent adjustments in the provisions held for loans originated in previous periods. The degree
of cyclicality of the impact on P&L under different accounting regimes, therefore, cannot be
told beforehand and depends crucially on how financial institutions are assumed to incorporate
information in the expectations of lifetime losses.
In order to simulate the effect of P&L accounts we use a database of Italian mortgages from
2006 to 2018. We model the impact of credit impairments on P&L under different accounting
regimes in a historical scenario for default rates and newly originated loans, under different
assumptions on how financial institutions incorporate information on varying loss rates.
We obtain the following results: Firstly, as expected, provisions under IFRS 9 forecast
default approximately one year in advance, with provisions for loans in Stage 1 accounting for
the greatest share of the impact on P&L; Stage 2 loan provisions do not have a meaningful
effect. The impact on P&L under IFRS 9 is, therefore, much less procyclical than under the
previous regime (IAS 39, where it just coincided with realized losses, which occur well after the
default), but still substantially more procyclical than US GAAP.
Secondly, provisions under US GAAP appear to be less cyclical than those required under
IFRS 9 under different assumptions on how financial institutions incorporate information in the
expectations of lifetime losses. The lower procyclicality of US GAAP, however, comes at the
cost of holding a larger stock of provisions at all times.
We perform several robustness checks relaxing our methodological assumptions as well as
comparative statics on the parameters of the model; for instance, we explore alternative mech-
anisms of migrations from and to Stage 2 for the IFRS 9 regime.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our results have relevant implications for supervisors
and policymakers. Although the aim of accounting regulation is not to tackle procyclicality, the
latter requires attention from a financial stability standpoint.
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1. Introduction
In the early years of the 21st century, the accounting of financial assets was still guided by
International Accounting Standard 39 (IASB, 2004), which prescribed the use of the incurred
loss model for the recognition of credit losses in the profit and loss (P&L) account. If there was
objective evidence that an impairment loss on a loan had been incurred, the amount of the loss
needed to be calculated; however, losses expected as a result of future events were not recognized.
As stated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in BCBS (2015a), following the
financial crisis of the late 2000s, concerns were raised about this method, particularly about the
timeliness of banks recognition of loan loss expenses. More concretely, recognizing losses after
they have been incurred on a financial asset has been widely criticized for being “too little, too
late”, as detailed in Gaston and Song (2014).
Procyclicality in banks financial soundness and credit supply is a well-known issue with many
roots, such as the tendency to make a more lenient assessment of risk in good times than in bad
ones, the amplification of shocks led by varying collateral valuations, the inclination of financial
institutions to show herd behavior, and deterioration in managerial ability; A non-exhaustive
set of references is Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008), Jime´nez and
Saurina (2006) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), among others. Moreover, an extensive literature
stresses the links between the accounting treatment of credit portfolios and procyclicality in
lending and risk-taking1. Moreover, Stoian and Norden (2013), Wall and Koch (2000), Laeven
and Majnoni (2003), Bushman and Williams (2015) and Ahmed et al. (1999) argue that banks
have incentives for using discretion in establishing loan loss provisions to manage reported capital
and earnings.
In response to such concerns, the G20 leaders issued a clear mandate to reform interna-
tional prudential and accounting standards, reducing complexity and procyclicality and in-
creasing coordination among the various standards used, as stated in G20 (2009). The G20
endorsed the Financial Stability Forum s report on addressing procyclicality in the financial
system (FSF, 2009), according to which “earlier recognition of loan losses could have damp-
ened cyclical moves” and “earlier identification of credit losses is consistent both with financial
statement users needs for transparency regarding changes in credit trends and with prudential
objectives of safety and soundness”. The report also recommended the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to replace the
incurred loss method of loan loss provisioning with alternative approaches that “incorporate a
broader range of available credit information”, i.e. with a more forward-looking expected loss
method using statistical information to identify probable future losses. The result has been the
publication of International Financial Reporting Standards 9 (IFRS 9) “Financial Instruments”
in July 2014 (IASB, 2014) and the US GAAP in July 2016 (FASB, 2016). The primary differ-
ence between the two approaches is the method for impairment calculation (full lifetime in US
GAAP vs staging in IFRS 9)
This paper contributes to the literature that aims at establishing whether forward-looking
accounting standards are actually more procyclical. There is a lack of consensus among the
1See, for example, BCBS (2015), Beatty and Liao (2011), Schwartz et al. (2014) or Bushman and Williams
(2012).
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research conducted so far on this issue. Earlier literature as well as policymakers agreed on
the fact that forward-looking provisioning would reduce procyclicality; some examples are Balla
and McKenna (2009), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Wezel et al. (2012), FSF (2009) and BCBS
(2009). Conversely, more recent contributions point in the opposite direction: Two prominent
examples are Barclays (2017) and Abad and Sua´rez (2017). In particular, the latter find that
under the two forward-looking accounting standards, the impact of an exogenous increase in
substandard loans on P&L and capital is greater than under the incurred loss approach (with the
IFRS 9 impact being the greatest). They conclude, therefore, that forward-looking approaches
may amplify the effect of an unexpected increase in risk, since they concentrate the impact on
P&L of future losses at the beginning of a contractionary phase of the credit or business cycle,
possibly determining negative feedback effects on credit supply just as economic conditions start
to worsen.
In this paper, we will focus exclusively on the dynamics of P&L impact under different
accounting standards (IAS 39, IFRS 9 or US GAAP) with a simulated mortgage portfolio.
More precisely, we investigate the degree of contemporaneous correlation with GDP as well as
realized losses. Our results suggest that, in order to reduce the cyclicality of impairments, it is
preferable to use an accounting method that takes into consideration the expected loss of credit
portfolios over the entire lifetime of the asset, i.e., the approach followed by US GAAP.
In the latter case, since for each loan provisions made at the origination date account for
its lifetime expected credit loss (ECL), overall provisions tend to increase with the flow of
newly originated loans, ceteris paribus. Given that the latter is negatively correlated with
default rates, two opposite effects influence the dynamics of provisions: While a higher new
loan origination rate tends to increase provisions during credit cycle s boom phases (and vice
versa during crises), it is also possible that lifetime ECL is underestimated during credit booms,
leading to insufficient provisioning at inception and subsequent adjustments in the provisions
held for loans originated in previous periods. Thus, the degree of cyclicality (in the sense
previously defined of contemporaneous correlation with the evolution of credit quality) of the
impact on P&L under the US GAAP framework, and how it compares with IFRS 9, cannot be
disentangled beforehand but depends on which effect is empirically greater.
We model the impact of credit impairments on P&L under different accounting regimes in
a historical scenario for default rates and newly originated loans, under different assumptions
on how financial institutions incorporate information in the expectation for lifetime losses. We
alternatively assume that (a) financial institutions are able to correctly forecast future defaults,
so that no underestimation of ECL is possible; (b) their perfect forecasting ability is limited
to a one-year horizon, after which the loss rate is assumed to revert to the sample s average
value; (c) after one year of perfect forecast loss rates revert to the average of the previous five
years. Under (b) and (c), therefore, underestimation of ECL at inception is possible and implies
adjustments in the provisions for older loans as new information becomes available.
As expected, provisions under IFRS 9 forecast realized losses approximately one year in
advance, with the provisions for loans in Stage 1 accounting for the greatest share of the impact
on P&L: provisions for Stage 2 loans do not have a significant effect. The impact on P&L under
IFRS 9, therefore, appears less procyclical than under the previous regime (IAS 39, where it just
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coincided with realized losses), but still likely to hit financial institutions when a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle has already started. Provisions under US GAAP appear to
be less cyclical then those required under IFRS 9 under all the scenarios considered. The lower
procyclicality of US GAAP, however, comes at the cost of holding a larger stock of provisions at
all times. In contrast with Abad and Sua´rez (2017), we find that forward-looking impairment
accounting systems may allow to build up provisions in advance, smoothing out the impact of
losses2.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the
most important accounting regimes for credit instruments; in Section 3, we describe our data
sources. The methodology used in the paper is detailed in Section 4. Our aim results as well as
robustness checks constitute Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Regulation
In this section, we present a brief review of alternative accounting treatments — IAS 39,
IFRS 9 and US GAAP — for credit portfolios.
2.1. IAS 39
IAS 39 adopts an incurred loss approach for impairment accounting, i.e. after the initial
recognition of the asset it requires, at least, a loss event to occur for any impairment to be
recognized (IASB, 2004). A non-comprehensive list of loss events is provided, but the crucial
aspect is that expected losses stemming from future events cannot be accounted for. IAS 39
also allows to recognize collective provisioning or “incurred but not reported” (IBNR) losses3:
Statistical evidence can be used to work out the level of loss events already incurred, although
not yet recognized, in a loan portfolio. However, this proved insufficient both because of the
divergent application across countries and because the use of statistical evidence was limited to
the existence of trigger events after origination (ECB, 2014). Following the distress unleashed by
the financial crisis in the late 2000s, the incurred loss approach was broadly deemed “too little,
too late” (BCBS, 2015b). Among the measures adopted to mitigate the procyclicality of IAS
39, it is worth to mention the generic provision scheme adopted in Spain, implemented in Banco
de Espan˜a (2004)4 . This approach stemmed from IBNR collective provisioning (Saurina, 2009)
and its objective was to accumulate allowances in the boom years of the cycle for subsequent
use during crises5. However, it did not cover the full amount of specific provisions accumulated
2Differently from Abad and Sua´rez (2017), we do not make assumptions on neither dividend distribution
policies nor capital injections or net interest income. Their conclusions, however, follow mainly from the results
on the impact on P&L under the different regimes, on which we concentrate our analysis.
3See IAS 39, AG 89 and 90.
4Prior to the modification via CBE 4/2016, which increased alignment with IAS 39.
5This was done determining generic provisions via the following formula:
∆Generic provisiont =
N∑
k=1
(
αkt∆c
k
t + β
kCkt − Specific provisionkt
)
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by banks during crisis years, as detailed in Trucharte and Saurina (2013) and Banco de Espan˜a
(2017).
2.2. IFRS 9 nd Current Expecte Credit Lo s (CECL)
IASB published its final IFRS 9 implementation guidelines in July 2014 after several reviews
and failed efforts to converge with US GAAP. The most fundamental change concerned the im-
pairment accounting regime for financial instruments, which implies a shift in paradigm moving
from incurred to expected losses.
According to the new standard, the bank needs to recognize the expected loss for any financial
asset valued at amortized cost or fair value through other comprehensive income. The degree
to which the expected credit loss (henceforth, ECL) has to be recognized depends, however,
on the severity of credit quality deterioration. At origination or purchase of the asset, and as
long as the condition for classification other stages does not subsist, the value correction has to
account for the expected loss for the following 12 months (Stage 1). However, if there has been
a significant increase in the risk of the financial instrument from inception (Stage 2) or default
(Stage 3), the institution will recognize the expected loss for the full expected lifetime6.
A generalized significant increase in risk due, for example, to a deterioration of the economic
cycle, may determine a sharp rise (“cliff effect”) in the required provisions (IASB, 2013). Al-
though there is a certain degree of discretion in the recognition of a significant increase in risk,
some indications are provided; in particular, there is an assumption (rebuttable by the financial
institution) that a significant increase in risk exists in case of exposures which are past due for
more than 30 days. Additionally, IFRS 9 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of example crite-
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coincided with realized losses), but still likely to hit financial institutions when a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle has already started. Provisions under US GAAP appear to
be less cyclical then those required under IFRS 9 under all the scenarios considered. The lower
procyclicality of US GAAP, however, comes at the cost of holding a larger stock of provisions at
all times. In contrast with Abad and Sua´rez (2017), we find that forward-looking impairment
accounting systems may allow to build up provisions in advance, smoothing out the impact of
losses2.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the
most important accounting regimes for credit instruments; in Section 3, we describe our data
sources. The methodology used in the paper is detailed in Section 4. Our aim results as well as
robustness checks constitute Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Regulation
In this sec i n, we present a brief review of alternative accounting treatments — IAS 39,
IFRS 9 and US GAAP — for credi portfolios.
2.1. IAS 39
IAS 39 adopts an incurred loss approach for impairment accounting, i.e. after the initial
recognition of the asset it requires, at least, a loss event to occur for any impairment to be
recognized (IASB, 2004). A non-comprehensive list of loss events is provided, but the crucial
aspect is that expected losses stemming from future events cannot be accounted for. IAS 39
also allows to recognize collective provisioning or “incurred but not reported” (IBNR) losses3:
Statistical evidence can be used to work out the level of loss events already incurred, although
not yet recognized, in a loan portfolio. However, this proved insufficient both because of the
divergent application across countries and because the use of statistical evidence was limited to
the existence of trigger events after origination (ECB, 2014). Following the distress unleashed by
the financial crisis in the late 2000s, the incurred loss approach was broadly deemed “too little,
too late” (BCBS, 2015b). Among the measures adopted to mitigate the procyclicality of IAS
39, it is worth to mention the generic provision scheme adopted in Spain, implemented in Banco
de Espan˜a (2004)4 . This approach stemmed from IBNR collective provisioning (Saurina, 2009)
and its objective was to accumulate allowances in the boom years of the cycle for subsequent
use during crises5. However, it did not cover the full a ount of specific provisions accu ulated
2Differently from Abad and Sua´rez (2017), we do not make assumptions on neither dividend distribution
policies nor c pital njections or net interest income. Their conclusions, however, follow mainly from the results
on the impact on P&L under the different regimes, on which we concentrate our analysis.
3See IAS 39, AG 89 and 90.
4Prior t th modification via CBE 4/2016, which in reased alignment with IAS 39.
5This was done determining generic provisions via the following formula:
∆Generic provisiont =
N∑
k=1
(
αkt∆
k
t + β
kCkt − Specific provisionkt
)
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by banks during crisis years, as detailed in Trucharte and Saurina (2013) and Banco de Espan˜a
(2017).
2.2. IFRS 9 and Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL)
IASB published its final IFRS 9 implementation guidelines in July 2014 after several reviews
and failed efforts to converge with US GAAP. The most fundamental change concerned the im-
pairment accounting regime for financial instruments, which implies a shift in paradigm moving
from incurred to expected losses.
According to the new standard, the bank needs to recognize the expected loss for any financial
asset valued at amortized cost or fair value through other comprehensive income. The degree
to which the expected credit loss (henceforth, ECL) has to be recognized depends, however,
on the severity of credit quality deterioration. At origination or purchase of the asset, and as
long as the condition for classification other stages does not subsist, the value correction has to
account for the expected loss for the following 12 months (Stage 1). However, if there has been
a significant increase in the risk of the financial instrument from inception (Stage 2) or default
(Stage 3), the institution will recognize the expected loss for the full expected lifetime6.
A generalized significant increase in risk due, for example, to a deterioration of the economic
cycle, may determine a sharp rise (“cliff effect”) in the required provisions (IASB, 2013). Al-
though there is a certain degree of discretion in the recognition of a significant increase in risk,
some indications are provided; in particular, there is an assumption (rebuttable by the financial
institution) that a significant increase in risk exists in case of exposures which are past due for
more than 30 days. Additionally, IFRS 9 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of example crite-
ria to recognize increases in risk, notably the criterion based on loan pricing, which suggests a
comparison between the prices of existing and new portfolios as a proxy for risk increases7.
As previously noted, after several failed attempts at convergence the FASB published its
own financial instrument accounting standard, which is known as Current Expected Credit Loss
(CECL) and tries to prevent under-provisioning by immediately recognizing, at the moment
of origination or purchase of the asset, the full amount of credit losses expected over the as-
sets foreseeable lifetime (FASB, 2016 and European Parliament, 2015a). In terms of IFRS 9,
this would be similar to recognizing every asset directly in Stage 2. The FASB approach would
also be conceptually close to the late Spanish collective provision with the only nuance of the
automatic mechanism both for accumulating and releasing provisions, as explained in Trucharte
and Saurina (2013).
The updated weighted averages of the expected credit losses (with the weights being the
respective probabilities of default) are defined as the updated differences between expected and
contractual payments. The expected loss must be estimated taking into account the weighted
where Ci is the stock of loans in portfolio k at time t. The coefficients α and β represent respectively the rate
of credit losses in a cyclically neutral year and the average specific provision for loans in a specific portfolio k,
estimated on the basis of historical data for Spanish banks.
6In order to move an asset from Stage 1 to Stage 2, thus recognizing a significant increase in default risk,
the entity should evaluate the variation in the probability of default (PD) for the asset s lifetime. However, an
increase in the twelve-month PD might be a good proxy for lifetime PD (IFRS 9, B5.5.13).
7Also mentioned in EBA (2017), paragraph 107.
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probability of default, the expected recovery rate, the time value of money and all the available
information. The pro eeds from collateral must be included when calculating the expected cash
flows once execution costs have been deducted. Finally, the rate used to actualize shortages in
payments will be the origin l rate at inception; hus, subsequent change in interest rates after
a loan s inception are not relevant for the calculation of provisions.
2.3. Linkages betwee accounting and regulatory provisio s
The main goal of accounting standards is not to reduce procyclicality but to depict a truthful
representation of the company s financial c ndition. This is the reason why the cyclicality of the
provisioning regime is mitigated via prudential capital requirements. Nevertheless, the results of
accounting and regulatory provisions are not independent from each other and the FSF (2009)
report recommended accounting standard setters to replace the incurred losses approach with
an expected losses one, arguing that “earlier identification of credit losses is consistent both with
financial statement users needs for transparency (...) and with prudential objectives”.
Accounting and regulatory provisions, however, still differ under several perspectives, and
to avoid any undue shock in solvency, the first implementation of the ECL approaches is to be
mitigated via transitional arrangements (see BCBS, 2017). In this section, we explore the pri-
mary differences between accounting and regulatory expected losses from the P&L perspective.
In this line, it is reasonable to expect that credit parameters used for regulatory purposes be
the basis for calculating accounting parameters; however, these parameters will be adjusted for
the different purposes of each view (as mentioned in both the EBA and Basel guidelines).
For prudential purposes, the probabilities of default (PD) estimates are based on long-run
averages (through the cycle approach, TTC) of one-year default rates. For accounting purposes,
the PD is the point-in-time (PiT) value appropriate for each reporting period. As we have seen,
the time horizon greatly depends on the accounting standard, full lifetime for US GAAP and
the three-stage approach of IFRS 9.
In the same manner, for regulatory purposes, loss given default (LGD) estimates are expected
to consider an economic downturn if this leads to more conservative estimates than the long-run
average. However, for accounting purposes the best point-in-time estimation is chosen to avoid
any bias.
Prudential regulation might be able to partly mitigate procyclicality. Firstly, discrepancies in
accounting and regulatory expected losses will be considered in regulatory capital8. Besides, the
level of provisions must be factored in during the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process to
determine Pillar 2 capital requirements (EBA, 2014). These elements might be used to mitigate
the potentially procyclical impact of the new accounting regime. However, one should bear
in mind that accounting is crucial for incentives to managers (impact on dividends, bonuses,
reputation in the market...); for this reason, it is of utmost importance to assess the cyclical
aspects of accounting regimes.
8According to the CRR, for banks following the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, deficits in accounting
provisions will be deducted from Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital while surplus will be included as Tier 2
capital (with a cap of 1.25% of the total risk exposure amount stemming from credit risk).
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compa is n between th prices of existing and new portfolios as a proxy for risk increases7.
As previously no ed, after sev ral failed att m ts at c nvergence the FASB published its
own financial instrum nt ccounting standard, which is know as Current Expected Credit Los
(CECL) and tries to prevent under-provisioning by immediately recognizing, at the moment
of origination or purchase of the asset, the full amount of credit losses expected ov r the as-
sets foreseeable lifetime (FASB, 2016 and European Parliament, 2015a). In terms of IFRS 9,
thi would be similar to recognizing every asset directly in Stage 2. The FASB approach would
also be conc ptually cl se t the lat Spanish collective provision wit the only nuan e of the
utomatic m chanism both for accumulati g and r leasing prov sions, as explained in Truchart
nd Saurina (2013).
The updated weighted averages of the expected credit losses (with the weights being the
respective probabilit es of default) are defin d as he upda ed differences betwe n expected and
contractual paymen s. The expected loss must be stim taking into account the weighte
where Ci is the stock of loans in portfolio k at time t. The coefficients α and β represent respectively the rate
of credit losses in a cyclically neutral year and the average spec fic provision or loans in a specific portfolio k,
estimated on the basis of historical data for Spanish banks.
6In order to move an asset from Stage 1 to Stage 2, thus recognizing a significant increase in default risk,
the entity should evaluate the variation in th probability of default (PD) for the asset s lifetime. However, a
increase in the twelve-month PD might be a good proxy for lifetime PD (IFRS 9, B5.5.13).
7Also mentione in EBA (2017), paragraph 107.
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probability of default, the expected recovery rate, the time value of money and all the available
information. The proceeds from collateral must be included when calculating the expected cash
flows once execution costs have been deducted. Finally, the rate used to actualize shortages in
payments will be the original rate at inception; thus, subsequent changes in interest rates after
a loan s inception are not relevant for the calculation of provisions.
2.3. Linkages between accounting and regulatory provisions
The main goal of accounting standards is not to reduce procyclicality but to depict a truthful
representation of the company s financial condition. This is the reason why the cyclicality of the
provisioning regime is mitigated via prudential capital requirements. Nevertheless, the results of
accounting and regulatory provisions are not independent from each other and the FSF (2009)
report recommended accounting standard setters to replace the incurred losses approach with
an expected losses one, arguing that “earlier identification of credit losses is consistent both with
financial statement users needs for transparency (...) and with prudential objectives”.
Accounting and regulatory provisions, however, still differ under several perspectives, and
to avoid any undue shock in solvency, the first implementation of the ECL approaches is to be
mitigated via transitional arrangements (see BCBS, 2017). In this section, we explore the pri-
mary differences between accounting and regulatory expected losses from the P&L perspective.
In this line, it is reasonable to expect that credit parameters used for regulatory purposes be
the basis for calculating accounting parameters; however, these parameters will be adjusted for
the different purposes of each view (as mentioned in both the EBA and Basel guidelines).
For prudential purposes, the probabilities of default (PD) estimates are based on long-run
averages (through the cycle approach, TTC) of one-year default rates. For accounting purposes,
the PD is the point-in-time (PiT) value appropriate for each reporting period. As we have seen,
the time horizon greatly depends on the accounting standard, full lifetime for US GAAP and
the three-stage approach of IFRS 9.
In the same manner, for regulatory purposes, loss given default (LGD) estimates are expected
to consider an economic downturn if this leads to more conservative estimates than the long-run
average. However, for accounting purposes the best point-in-time estimation is chosen to avoid
any bias.
Prudential regulation might be able to partly mitigate procyclicality. Firstly, discrepancies in
accounting and regulatory expected losses will be considered in regulatory capital8. Besides, the
level of provisions must be factored in during the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process to
determine Pillar 2 capital requirements (EBA, 2014). These elements might be used to mitigate
the potentially procyclical impact of the new accounting regime. However, one should bear
in mind that accounting is crucial for incentives to managers (impact on dividends, bonuses,
reputation in the market...); for this reason, it is of utmost importance to assess the cyclical
aspects of accounting regimes.
8According to the CRR, for banks following the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, deficits in accounting
provisions will be deducted from Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital while surplus will be included as Tier 2
capital (with a cap of 1.25% of the total risk exposure amount stemming from credit risk).
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2.4. Compa ison betwe n the different methods
One of the main issues that we want to address is the procyclicality of conditions for moving
from Stage 1 to Stage 2. Most of the events that may trigger the reclassification from Stage 1
to Stage 2, such as changes in internal and external ratings, value of collateral, pricing of the
credit risk or financial soundness of the borrower, are highly correlated with the business cycle.
A widespread concern is that the “cliff effect” may exacerbate the increases in provisions due to
the simultaneous deterioration of credit quality for a significant portion of the portfolio. Abad
and Sua´rez (2017) find that the impact on P&L of an exogenous increase in substandard loans
under an IFRS 9 regime would be particularly concentrated at the beginning of a contractionary
phase of e credit or business cycle, with negative feedback effects on credit supply. In the next
sections, we conduct a similar analysis showing that, while IFRS 9 does not seem to be able to
decisively solve the issue of procyclicality, in contrast with the results of Abad and Sua´rez (2017)
the impact of the “cliff effect” is likely to be small and not determine an excessive concentration
of provisions at the turning point of the cycle. The other framework we study, US GAAP, seems
better suited to smooth future losses over time.
We share some of the criticisms on the FASB accounting approach. The CECL approach, by
frontloading all the future expected losses, implies the recognition of a significant amount of day-
one losses. This also reduces comparability among portfolios and institutions since riskier loans
will present higher initial losses, while their net present value is not lower if risk premiums are
correctly set. However, in this paper we analyze only the cyclical behavior of the two methods,
disregarding the comparison from a pure accounting perspective.
3. Data
In Section 5, we will propose an exercise which simulates provisions and losses under different
regimes for a fictional portfolio composed only of mortgages with 20-year maturity over the years
2006-2018. This section describes the data used to feed the simulation, its sources and some
methodological choices.
Average default rates for mortgages are estimated from the Italian central credit register
(Centrale dei Rischi, CR). We consider loans with a predetermined maturity granted to house-
holds: given the minimum threshold of 30,000 euros for inclusion in the dataset, these loans are
mostly constituted by mortgages. In order to estimate default rates, we divide the amount of
loans in default at the end of each period by the amount that were performing at the beginning
of the quarter. Quarterly default rates are then seasonally adjusted through the X-13 proce-
dure. Information on defaulted loans compatible with the current harmonized EBA definition
of non-performing loans is available from 2006 (Figure 1).
The probability of default, however, is not constant over the life of a loan; while various
idiosyncratic events may intervene, default probability tends to be lower at the very beginning
of a loan s lifecycle (when the information under which it was granted is more likely to still hold
true) and for older loans (i.e. ‘survivors’ are likely to have idiosyncratic characteristics that
make them more resilient). We are particularly interested in modeling the dependence between
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2.4. Comparison between the different methods
One of the main issues that we want to address is the procyclicality of conditions for moving
from Stage 1 to Stage 2. Most of the events that may trigger the reclassification from Stage 1
to Stage 2, such as changes in internal and external ratings, value of collateral, pricing of the
credit risk or financial soundness of the borrower, are highly correlated with the business cycle.
A widespread concern is that the “cliff effect” may exacerbate the increases in provisions due to
the simultaneous deterioration of credit quality for a significant portion of the portfolio. Abad
and Sua´rez (2017) find that the impact on P&L of an exogenous increase in substandard loans
under an IFRS 9 regime would be particularly concentrated at the beginning of a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle, with negative feedback effects on credit supply. In the next
sections, we conduct a similar analysis showing that, while IFRS 9 does not seem to be able to
decisively solve the issue of procyclicality, in contrast with the results of Abad and Sua´rez (2017)
the impact of the “cliff effect” is likely to be small and not determine an excessive concentration
of provisions at the turning point of the cycle. The other framework we study, US GAAP, seems
better suited to smooth future losses over time.
We share some of the criticisms on the FASB accounting approach. The CECL approach, by
frontloading all the future expected losses, implies the recognition of a significant amount of day-
one losses. This also reduces comparability among portfolios and institutions since riskier loans
will present higher initial losses, while their net present value is not lower if risk premiums are
correctly set. However, in this paper we analyze only the cyclical behavior of the two methods,
disregarding the comparison from a pure accounting perspective.
3. Data
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regimes for a fictional portfolio composed only of mortgages with 20-year maturity over the years
2006-2018. This section describes the data used to feed the simulation, its sources and some
methodological choices.
Average default rates for mortgages are estimated from the Italian central credit register
(Centrale dei Rischi, CR). We consider loans with a predetermined maturity granted to house-
holds: given the minimum threshold of 30,000 euros for inclusion in the dataset, these loans are
mostly constituted by mortgages. In order to estimate default rates, we divide the amount of
loans in default at the end of each period by the amount that were performing at the beginning
of the quarter. Quarterly default rates are then seasonally adjusted through the X-13 proce-
dure. Information on defaulted loans compatible with the current harmonized EBA definition
of non-performing loans is available from 2006 (Figure 1).
The probability of default, however, is not constant over the life of a loan; while various
idiosyncratic events may intervene, default probability tends to be lower at the very beginning
of a loan s lifecycle (when the information under which it was granted is more likely to still hold
true) and for older loans (i.e. ‘survivors’ are likely to have idiosyncratic characteristics that
make them more resilient). We are particularly interested in modeling the dependence between
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default rates and the age (i.e., the time since origination) of a loan, for it strengthens the link
between credit dynamics and credit risk.
Figure 1: Annualized default rates for mortgage loans
In our Italian data from the CR, unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify
multiple exposures toward the same subject nor the contractual maturity of mortgages at origi-
nation, which makes it difficult to estimate the relation between default rates and loan age. We
therefore obtain the latter using data from the European Data Warehouse (EDW), composed of
more than 9 million loans that are part of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from
several European countries. For each loan, the dataset contains the date of origination, the date
of maturity, and where applicable, the date of default9.
The EDW dataset has the benefit of providing a wide cross-country sample for European
loans but also some shortcomings that can introduce bias in the estimation of default probabil-
ities (PDs). The reason is twofold: First, even though the available evidence does not clearly
point to a systematic presence or even a clear direction of a selection bias in securitized pools
of loans in Europe10, we reckon that its existence is plausible. Second, the EDW dataset does
not include a complete history for each cohort of loans originated at a given date (origination
cohort) since institutions can start reporting the status of the loans included in a securitization
well after the date when it was initially created. When this is the case, information on loans ini-
tially included in the securitized pool but defaulted or matured before the first date of reporting
is generally not reported, since it is not mandatory.
Because of the potential presence of these two biases, we will only use this sample to charac-
terize the relative PD level changes as a function of the age of a loan because we assert that it is
not affected by these biases, even if the average PD is over- or underestimated. However, since
9Institutions report information on securitisation deals that have not reached maturity (as is usually the case)
and begin reporting significantly after the creation of the product, providing only information on the current
status of the underlying pool of loans (i.e., omitting information on loans originally included in the pool but
that have since reached maturity, or that have defaulted and all the recovery procedures have been concluded so
that no further cash flows are expected). This creates some issues in the estimation of probability of default, as
explained in Section 4.
10For an analysis of the impact of securitization on screening and monitoring activity and a summary of the
relevant literature, see Salleo et al. (2011).
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2.4. Comparison between the different methods
One of the main issues that we want to address is the procyclicality of conditions for moving
from Stage 1 to Stage 2. Most of the events that may trigger the reclassification from Stage 1
to Stage 2, such as changes in internal and external ratings, value of collateral, pricing of the
credit risk or financial soundness of the borrower, are highly correlated with the business cycle.
A widespread concern is that the “cliff effect” may exacerbate the increases in provisions due to
the simultaneous deterioration of credit quality for a significant portion of the portfolio. Abad
and Sua´rez (2017) find that the impact on P&L of an exogenous increase in substandard loans
under an IFRS 9 regime would be particularly concentrated at the beginning of a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle, with negative feedback effects on credit supply. In the next
sections, we conduct a similar analysis showing that, while IFRS 9 does not seem to be able to
decisively solve the issue of procyclicality, in contrast with the results of Abad and Sua´rez (2017)
the impact of the “cliff effect” is likely to be small and not determine an excessive concentration
of provisions at the turning point of the cycle. The other framework we study, US GAAP, seems
better suited to smooth future losses over time.
We share some of the criticisms on the FASB accounting approach. The CECL approach, by
frontloading all the future expected losses, implies the recognition of a significant amount of day-
one losses. This also reduces co parability among portfolios and institutions since riskier loans
will present higher initial losses, while their net present value is not lower if risk premiums are
correctly set. However, in this paper we analyze only the cyclical behavior of the two methods,
disregarding the comparison from a pure accounting perspective.
3. Data
In Section 5, we will propose an exercise which simulates provisions and losses under different
regimes for a fictional portfolio composed only of mortgages with 20-year maturity over the years
2006-2018. This section describes the data used to feed the simulation, its sources and some
methodological choices.
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dure. Information on defaulted loans compatible with the current harmonized EBA definition
of non-performing loans is available from 2006 (Figure 1).
The probability of default, however, is not constant over the life of a loan; while various
idiosyncratic events may intervene, default probability tends to be lower at the very beginning
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true) and for older loans (i.e. ‘survivors’ are likely to have idiosyncratic characteristics that
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default rates and the age (i.e., the time since origination) of a loan, for it strengthens the link
between credit dynamics and credit risk.
Figure 1: Annualized default rates for mortgage loans
In our Italian data from the CR, unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify
multiple exposures toward the same subject nor the contractual maturity of mortgages at origi-
nation, which makes it difficult to estimate the relation between default rates and loan age. We
therefore obtain the latter using data from the European Data Warehouse (EDW), composed of
more than 9 million loans that are part of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from
several European countries. For each loan, the dataset contains the date of origination, the date
of maturity, and where applicable, the date of default9.
The EDW dataset has the benefit of providing a wide cross-country sample for European
loans but also some shortcomings that can introduce bias in the estimation of default probabil-
ities (PDs). The reason is twofold: First, even though the available evidence does not clearly
point to a systematic presence or even a clear direction of a selection bias in securitized pools
of loans in Europe10, we reckon that its existence is plausible. Second, the EDW dataset does
not include a complete history for each cohort of loans originated at a given date (origination
cohort) since institutions can start reporting the status of the loans included in a securitization
well after the date when it was initially created. When this is the case, information on loans ini-
tially included in the securitized pool but defaulted or matured before the first date of reporting
is generally not reported, since it is not mandatory.
Because of the potential presence of these two biases, we will only use this sample to charac-
terize the relative PD level changes as a function of the age of a loan because we assert that it is
not affected by these biases, even if the average PD is over- or underestimated. However, since
9Institutions report information on securitisation deals that have not reached maturity (as is usually the case)
and begin reporting significantly after the creation of the product, providing only information on the current
status of the underlying pool of loans (i.e., omitting information on loans originally included in the pool but
that have since reached maturity, or that have defaulted and all the recovery procedures have been concluded so
that no further cash flows are expected). This creates some issues in the estimation of probability of default, as
explained in Section 4.
10For an analysis of the impact of securitization on screening and monitoring activity and a summary of the
relevant literature, see Salleo et al. (2011).
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the PD for a given age must be estimated using default rates from cohorts whose origination date
is not successive to the current date minus the specific age, the PD for higher age buckets would
be affected by a downward survivorship bias. This effect can be removed by excluding from the
sample those loans originated before the first date of information reporting of the securitisation
deal to which they belong. However, this solution is unsuitable for our purposes, since it would
leave us with the possibility of studying the evolution of PD only within a small number of years
from origination. Instead, we decided to accept the presence of some bias but, to mitigate the
problem, we exclude fro the sample the loans originated before 2000 or after 2010, for which
underestimation of PD is more likely.
In a nutshell, we will use the Italian credit register to obtain the average PD for each period
and the EDW database for establishing the relationship between the age of a loan (i.e., the time
from origination) and its probability of default11.
According to the IFRS 9 dispositions, a rebuttable presumption exists that the 30-day past
due status represents a significant increase in the risk qualifier for loans. Unfortunately, this
information is not available. However, we know the share of non-performing loans that are 90-
days past due at the end of each quarter; if payments stop with uniform probability within each
quarter, approximately two thirds of the 90-day past due loans at the end of the quarter would
already be 30-days past due by the end of the previous quarter. Therefore, we approximate the
amount of loans with significant risk increase in t12 with
SRIt =
2
3
PastDue90t+1 (1)
Data on new loans for house purchases in Italy is extracted from the MFI Interest Rate
Statistics (MIR), available at the European Central Bank s Statistical Data Warehouse13. In
our simulation exercise, in each period new loans are originated for a normalized amount that
tracks the historical series of new loans for house purchases, as depicted in Figure 2.
The dynamics of the overall stock of (performing) loans are therefore determined by the
difference between the speed at which new loans are originated, which is inversely correlated
with credit quality, the outflows deriving from regular repayments, following the amortization
schedule in equation (2) below, and defaults14.
Other relevant information for modeling the effect of various impairment accounting rules
is represented by the residual maturity of the loans in the portfolio. Impairment accounting
rules indeed differ regarding the moment at which provisions must be made: under US GAAP,
provisions are set aside at origination so that they tend to increase during credit cycle upswings
11Notice that if the PD is estimated conditional on the number of years from origination, right-censoring is
not a source of bias: loans for which, at the sample cut-off date, neither default has been observed nor maturity
has been reached are not considered part of the pool of loans alive at ages above the age they possess at the
cut-off date. This is not true for the average default rate, which must be calculated removing from the sample
right-censored observations to avoid a downward bias.
12This proxy is likely to slightly underestimate the amount of 90-day past due loans, since it excludes those
exposures which enter and exit the status within the 90 days.
13More precisely, the series contains new business related to “lending for house purchase, excluding revolving
loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt” (MIR.M.IT.B.A2C.A.B.A.2250.EUR.N).
14Notice that the overall stock of outstanding loans reported in aggregate statistics such as MIR includes NPLs
instead.
12
default rates and the age (i.e., the time since origination) of a loan, for it strengthens the link
between credit dynamics and credit risk.
Figure 1: Annualized default rates for mortgage loans
In our Italian data from the CR, unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify
multiple exposures toward the same subject nor the contractual maturity of mortgages at origi-
nation, which makes it difficult to estimate the relation between default rates and loan age. We
therefore obtain the latter using data from the European Data Warehouse (EDW), composed of
more than 9 million loans that are part of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from
several European countries. For each loan, the dataset contains the date of origination, the date
of maturity, and where applicable, the date of default9.
The EDW dataset has the benefit of providing a wide cross-country sample for European
loans but also some shortcomings that can introduce bias in the estimation of default probabil-
ities (PDs). The reason is twofold: First, even though the available evidence does not clearly
point to a systematic presence or even a clear direction of a selection bias in securitized pools
of loans in Europe10, we reckon that its existence is plausible. Second, the EDW dataset does
not include a complete history for each cohort of loans originated at a given date (origination
cohort) since institutions can start reporting the st tus of the loans included in a securitization
well after the date when it was initially created. When this is the case, information on loans ini-
tially included in the securitized pool but defaulted or matured before the first date of reporting
is generally not reported, since it is not mandatory.
Because of the potential presence of these two biases, we will only use this sample to charac-
terize the relative PD level changes as a function of the age of a loan because we assert that it is
not affected by these biases, even if the average PD is over- or underestimated. However, since
9Institutions report information on securitisation deals that have not reached maturity (as is usually the case)
and begin reporting significantly after the creation of the product, providing only information on the current
status of the underlying pool of loans (i.e., omitting information on loans originally included in the pool but
that have since reached maturity, or that have defaulted and all the recovery procedures have been concluded so
that no further cash flows are expected). This creates some issues in the estimation of probability of default, as
explained in Section 4.
10For an analysis of the impact of securitization on screening and monitoring activity and a summary of the
relevant literature, see Salleo et al. (2011).
11
default rates and the age (i.e., the time since origination) of a loan, for it strengthens the link
b tween cr dit dynamics and credit risk.
Figure 1: Annu lized default rates f mor gage loans
In our Italian data from the CR, unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify
multiple exposures toward the same subject nor the contractual maturity of mortgages at origi-
nation, which makes it difficult to estimate the relation between default rates and loan ge. We
therefore obtain the latter using data from the European Data Warehouse (EDW), composed of
mo than 9 million loans that are part of residential mortgage-b cked curities (RMBS) from
several European countries. For each loan, the dataset c ntains the date of origination, the date
of maturity, and where applicable, the date of ef ult9.
The EDW atas t has the b nefit of pr vi ing a wide cross-country sample for European
loans but also some shortcomings tha can introduce bias in the estimation of d fault probabil-
ities (PDs). The r ason is twofold: First, even though the available evidence does not clearly
point to a systematic pre ence r even a clear direction of a selection bias in securitized pools
of loans in Europe10, we r ckon that its existence is plausible. Second, the EDW dataset doe
not include a c mplete history for each cohort of loans originated at a given date (origination
c hort) since institutions can start reporting the status of the loans included in securitiz i
well after th da e whe it wa ini ially created. When this is the case, information on loans ini-
tially includ d in the securitized pool but defaulted or matured befor the first date of reporti g
is generally not report d, sinc it is not mandatory.
Because of h pot ntial presence f these tw biases, we will only use this sample to charac-
terize the relative PD level changes as a function of th age of a l an because we asser that it is
not affected by these biases, even if the average PD is over- or underestimated. However, since
9Institutions report information on securitisation deals that have not reached maturity (as is usually the case)
and begin reporting significantly after the creation of the product, providing only information on the current
status of the underlying pool of loans (i.e., omitting information on loans originally included in the pool but
that have since reached maturity, or that have defaulted and all the recovery procedures have been concluded so
that no further cash flows are expected). This creates some issues in the estimation of probability of default, as
explained in Section 4.
10For an analysis of the impact of securitization on screening and monitoring activity and a summary of the
relevant literature, see Salleo et al. (2011).
11
default rates and the age (i.e., the time since origination) of a loan, for it strengthens the link
between credit dynamics and credit risk.
Figure 1: Annualized default rates for mortgage loans
In our Italian data from the CR, unfortunately, it is not possible to separately identify
multiple exposures toward the same subject nor the contractual maturity of mortgages at origi-
nation, which makes it difficult to estimate the relation between default rates and loan age. We
therefore obtain the latter using data from the European Data Warehouse (EDW), composed of
more than 9 million loans that are part of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from
several European countries. For each loan, the dataset contains the date of origination, the date
of maturity, and where applicable, the date of default9.
The EDW dataset has the benefit of providing a wide cross-country sample for European
loans but also some shortcomings that can introduce bias in the estimation of default probabil-
ities (PDs). The reason is twofold: First, even though the available evidence does not clearly
point to a systematic presence or even a clear direction of a selection bias in securitized pools
of loans in Europe10, we reckon that its existence is plausible. Second, the EDW dataset does
not includ a complete history for a h cohort of loans originated at a given date (origination
cohort) since institutions can start reporting the status of the loans included in a securitization
well after the date when it was initially cr d. When this is the case, information on loans ini-
tially included in the securitized pool but defaulted or matured before the first date of reporting
is generally not r port d, since it is not mandatory.
Because of the potential presence of these two biases, we will only use this sample to charac-
terize the relative PD level changes as a function of the age of a loan because we assert that it is
not affected by these biases, even if the average PD is over- or underestimated. However, since
9Institutions report information on securitisation deals that have not reached maturity (as is usually the case)
and begin reporting significantly after the creation of the product, providing only information on the current
status of the unde lying pool of loans (i.e., omitti g information on loans originally included in the ool but
that have since reached maturity, or that have defaulted and all the recovery procedures have been concluded so
that no further cash flows are expected). This creates some issues in the estimation of probability of default, as
explained in Sec on 4.
10For an analysis of the impact of securitization on screening and monitoring activity and a summary of the
relevant literature, see Salleo et al. (2011).
11
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2003
the PD for a given age must be estimated using default rates from cohorts whose origination date
is not successive to the current date minus the specific age, the PD for higher age buckets would
be affected by a downward survivorship bias. This effect can be removed by excluding from the
sample those loans originated before the first date of information reporting of the securitisation
deal to which they belong. However, this solution is unsuitable for our purposes, since it would
leave us with the possibility of studying the evolution of PD only within a small number of years
from origination. Instead, we decided to accept the presence of some bias but, to mitigate the
problem, we exclude from the sample the loans originated before 2000 or after 2010, for which
underestimation of PD is more likely.
In a nutshell, we will use the Italian credit register to obtain the average PD for each period
and the EDW database for establishing the relationship between the age of a loan (i.e., the time
from origination) and its probability of default11.
According to the IFRS 9 dispositions, a rebuttable presumption exists that the 30-day past
due status represents a significant increase in the risk qualifier for loans. Unfortunately, this
information is not available. However, we know the share of non-performing loans that are 90-
days past due at the end of each quarter; if payments stop with uniform probability within each
quarter, approximately two thirds of the 90-day past due loans at the end of the quarter would
already be 30-days past due by the end of the previous quarter. Therefore, we approximate the
amount of loans with significant risk increase in t12 with
SRIt =
2
3
PastDue90t+1 (1)
Data on new loans for house purchases in Italy is extracted from the MFI Interest Rate
Statistics (MIR), available at the European Central Bank s Statistical Data Warehouse13. In
our simulation exercise, in each period new loans are originated for a normalized amount that
tracks the historical series of new loans for house purchases, as depicted in Figure 2.
The dynamics of the overall stock of (performing) loans are therefore determined by the
difference between the speed at which new loans are originated, which is inversely correlated
with credit quality, the outflows deriving from regular repayments, following the amortization
schedule in equation (2) below, and defaults14.
Other relevant information for modeling the effect of various impairment accounting rules
is represented by the residual maturity of the loans in the portfolio. Impairment accounting
rules indeed differ regarding the moment at which provisions must be made: under US GAAP,
provisions are set aside at origination so that they tend to increase during credit cycle upswings
11Notice that if the PD is estimated conditional on the number of years from origination, right-censoring is
not a source of bias: loans for which, at the sample cut-off date, neither default has been observed nor maturity
has been reached are not considered part of the pool of loans alive at ages above the age they possess at the
cut-off date. This is not true for the average default rate, which must be calculated removing from the sample
right-censored observations to avoid a downward bias.
12This proxy is likely to slightly underestimate the amount of 90-day past due loans, since it excludes those
exposures which enter and exit the status within the 90 days.
13More precisely, the series contains new business related to “lending for house purchase, excluding revolving
loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt” (MIR.M.IT.B.A2C.A.B.A.2250.EUR.N).
14Notice that the overall stock of outstanding loans reported in aggregate statistics such as MIR includes NPLs
instead.
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when the portfolio contains younger loans and vice versa15. In addition, both the PD and the
LGD, a detailed in Section 4, depend on the age of the loan meas red since its originati n. For
loss g ven efault, we model is dependence determinist cally.
The dynamics of the overall stock of performing loans (left axis), which is an index, are determined by the difference
between the speed with which new loans are originated and the outflows deriving from regular repayments and defaults.
Figure 2: New loans and simulated stock of loans
4. Methodology
In this section, we model a simplified version of the accounting regimes detailed in the
previous part. For simplification purposes, we will not allow for multiple default events or the
possibility that defaulted exposures return to performing status16. In addition, once the default
status is triggered, the LGD is deterministic and depends on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Finally, to focus on the differences between accounting regimes, we remove uncertainty from the
model by assuming that credit models are perfect in the sense that they can exactly predict
future outcomes.
4.1. Parameters
We construct provisions and realized losses through the computation of PD, LGD and ex-
posure at default (EAD) for the various years. In this subsection, we explain the assumptions
made to calculate these parameters.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use a single subscript t to denote the one-period time
span [t − 1, t]. PDt and LGDt are, respectively, the probability of default and the applicable
15This effect can be compensated by lower estimates for PD and LGD during credit cycle upswings. In the
following, we will in fact analyse both the case of perfect forecasting ability for all future periods — where the
underestimation of risk parameters is absent by assumption — and the case where the forecast horizon is limited
to one year forward, where underestimation of future risk at origination is possible. We also introduce stochastic
forecast errors in Section 5.3.
16This simplification assumptions have been chosen in line with standard practices; see, for example, the stress
testing methodology in EBA (2016).
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following, we will in fact analyse both the case of perfect forecasting ability for all future periods — where the
underestimation of risk parameters is absent by assumption — and the case where the forecast horizon is limited
to one year forward, where underestimation of future risk at origination is possible. We also introduce stochastic
forecast errors in Section 5.3.
16This simplification assumptions have been chosen in line with standard practices; see, for example, the stress
testing methodology in EBA (2016).
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loss given default betwee t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deterministic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value of the collateral C, and the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a deterministic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
17The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19We consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
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loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deterministic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value of the collateral C, and the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a deterministic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
17The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19We consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
14
loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deterministic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value of the collateral C, and the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of o uncertai ty and no chang s along the lif horizon
f t l an for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing th se
variables, th LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a determi istic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
17The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19We consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
14
loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a de erministic funct on of th loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the v lue of the collateral C, and the re idual exposure t a
giv n time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a deterministic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
7The proof of this result can be found in standard fi ancial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for ex mple, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19W c nsider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
14
loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
chan e between t and th moment of default, so that EADt i cons an t rough ut the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
e model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed inter s rate and a nual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt i
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deter inistic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ra io, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value f the collateral C, nd the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive r lation in ime between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of th loan. If the LTV ratio is small r than the
sales ratio SR (which is th quotient etw en the present value of the sale price and the v lue C
of the collateral), the en ir value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introd ce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is pro rtional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectiv ly
imposes an LGD fl or of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
e make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the resi ual expo u e at time t, a d LGD
a deterministic conc ve function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimburs d during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the a e of
th loan, as shown in Figure 3.
e have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for reside tial
mo tgages20.
17The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19W consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] rang , which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
14
loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deterministic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value of the collateral C, and the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our form la for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a deterministic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initial LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
17The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
8See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve n Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
9W consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable mo elling assumption, though
not crucial to any of the res lts pre e ted.
20see, for ex mple, EBA (2013).
14
loss given default bet een t 1 and t. or si plicity e assu e that the exposure does not
chan e bet een t and th o ent of default, so that t i cons an t rough ut the period.
4.1.1. os re at efa lt
We odel the evolution of according to a constant annuity a ortization schedule ith
a fixed inter s rate and a nual coupon pay ents. he residual exposure t i
17:
t · [ (1 r) (1 r)
t
(1 r) 1
] (2)
here is the loan a ount at inception, r is the interest rate and is the original aturity
of the loan. igure 3 sho s the variation ith the age of the loan, assu ing r 3 and
equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. oss gi e efa lt
ollo ing the literature18, in odeling loss given default e use a si plified structural odel
that represents s as a deter inistic function of the loan-to-value ( ) ra io, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value ( ) to the value f the collateral , nd the residual exposure at a
given ti e. learly, there i a positive r lation in i e bet en recovery rates and the reduction
of follo ing the progressive rei burse ent of th loan. If the ratio is s all r than the
sales ratio ( hich is th quotient et en the present value of the sale price and the v lue
of the collateral), the en ir value of the exposure can be recovered. In addit on, e introd ce a
cost of recovery procedures that is pro rtional to and equal to 5 . his effectiv ly
i poses an fl or of 5 even hen TVt . ur for ula for reads as follo s
19:
t ( t) ax 0,
t ·
t
ax 0,
TVt
TVt
(3)
We ake the si plifying assu ptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs , the collateral value and the sales ratio : ixing these
variables, the ratio is just a constant share of the resi ual expo u e at ti e t, a d
a deter inistic conc ve function of it. Since the loan is progressively rei burs d during his
lifeti e, given the assu ptions ratios and ill progressively decrease ith the a e of
th loan, as sho n in igure 3.
We have set the S value to 50 in this exercise and the initial at 80 to obtain an
average of 16.8 , hich is broadly in line th historical e pirical values for reside tial
o tgages20.
17 he proof of this result can be found in standard financial athe atics textbooks.
18See, for exa ple, i and ang (2009), reve and ahnenstein (2014) or oss and Shibut (2015).
19 e consider loan-to-value ratios ithin the (0, 1] range, hich is a reasonable odelling assu ption, though
not crucial to any of the results presented.
20see, for exa ple, E (2013).
14
Figure 3: EAD and LGD vs. age of the loan.
4.1.3. Probability of default
As explain d above e n ed to est mate the relation hip between the age of a loan ( .e., he
time from origination) and its probability of d fault. To do so, we need to ob erve cohorts of
loans with the sam origi ation date over their e tire lifeti e (i.e., until each of them defaults
or comes to maturity).
With this information, we ca stimate the probability of default PDt for each year following
origination using the default rate for age t, calculated as the number of defaults in the period
over the number of loans that either have not yet reached maturity or have defaulted at the
beginning of the period:
ˆPDt =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
Di,t (4)
Nt = Nt−1 −
Nt−1∑
i=1
Di,t−1 −
Nt−1∑
i=1
Mi,t−1 (5)
where Di,t and Mi,t are binary variables for the default and maturity of loan i at age t and
Nt is the number of loans survived.
In order to be consistent with the IFRS 9 framework and the rationale behind ex-
pected loss provisioning, we have also included forward-looking information in the cal-
culation of PDs using information from the ECB s Bank Lending Survey. The series
BLS.Q.IT.ALL.Z.H.H.F3.ST.S.FNET is available from 2003Q1 and collects the answers to the
question “Please indicate how you expect your bank s credit standards as applied to the approval
of loans to households to change over the next three months”; a negative (positive) value implies
a perceived net easing (tightening) of credit standards. If BLTt is the value of the bank lending
tightening series in period t, we rescale PDs so that
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PD∗t = ˆPDt ×
(
1 +
BLTt
BLTmax −BLTmin
)
(6)
Moreover, in the calculation of default probabilities, Kru¨ger, Ro¨sch and Scheule (2018) ac-
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loss given default between t − 1 and t. For simplicity we assume that the exposure does not
change between t and the moment of default, so that EADt is constant throughout the period.
4.1.1. Exposure at default
We model the evolution of EAD according to a constant annuity amortization schedule with
a fixed interest rate and annual coupon payments. The residual exposure EADt is
17:
EADt = L · [ (1 + r)
M − (1 + r)t
(1 + r)M − 1 ] (2)
where L is the loan amount at inception, r is the interest rate andM is the original maturity
of the loan. Figure 3 shows the EAD variation with the age of the loan, assuming r = 3% and
M equal to 20 years for all loans.
4.1.2. Loss given default
Following the literature18, in modeling loss given default we use a simplified structural model
that represents LGDs as a deterministic function of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the
ratio of the exposure value (EXP ) to the value of the collateral C, and the residual exposure at a
given time. Clearly, there is a positive relation in time between recovery rates and the reduction
of LTV following the progressive reimbursement of the loan. If the LTV ratio is smaller than the
sales ratio SR (which is the quotient between the present value of the sale price and the value C
of the collateral), the entire value of the exposure can be recovered. In addition, we introduce a
cost of recovery procedures CR that is proportional to EAD and equal to 5%. This effectively
imposes an LGD floor of 5% even when LTVt ≤ SR. Our formula for LGD reads as follows19:
LGDt ≡ LGD (EXPt) = CR+max
{
0,
EXPt − C · SR
EXPt
}
= CR+max
{
0,
LTVt − SR
LTVt
}
(3)
We make the simplifying assumptions of no uncertainty and no changes along the life horizon
of the loan for recovery costs CR, the collateral value C and the sales ratio SR: Fixing these
variables, the LTV ratio is just a constant share of the residual exposure at time t, and LGD
a deterministic concave function of it. Since the loan is progressively reimbursed during his
lifetime, given the assumptions LTV ratios and LGD will progressively decrease with the age of
the loan, as shown in Figure 3.
We have set the SR value to 50% in this exercise and the initi l LTV at 80% to obtain an
average LGD of 16.8%, which is broadly in line with historical empirical values for residential
mortgages20.
7The proof of this result can be found in standard financial mathematics textbooks.
18See, for example, Qi and Yang (2009), Greve and Hahnenstein (2014) or Ross and Shibut (2015).
19We consider loan-to-value ratios within the (0, 1] range, which is a reasonable modelling assumption, though
not crucial to any of he results presented.
20see, for example, EBA (2013).
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time from origination) and its probability of default. To do so, we need to observe cohorts of
loans with the same origination date over their entire lifetime (i.e., until each of them defaults
or comes to maturity).
With this information, we can estimate the probability of default PDt for each year following
origination using the default rate for age t, calculated as the number of defaults in the period
over the number of loans that either have not yet reached maturity or have defaulted at the
beginning of the period:
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where Di,t and Mi,t are binary variables for the default and maturity of loan i at age t and
Nt is the number of loans survived.
In order to be consistent with the IFRS 9 framework and the rationale behind ex-
pected loss provisioning, we have also included forward-looking information in the cal-
culation of PDs using information from the ECB s Bank Lending Survey. The series
BLS.Q.IT.ALL.Z.H.H.F3.ST.S.FNET is available from 2003Q1 and collects the answers to the
question “Please indicate how you expect your bank s credit standards as applied to the approval
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a perceived net easing (tightening) of credit standards. If BLTt is the value of the bank lending
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Moreover, in the calculation of default probabilities, Kru¨ger, Ro¨sch and Scheule (2018) ac-
count for macro conomic information f the US economy usi g the VIX volatility index as a
pro y, owing to its lea ing n ture for the economic juncture21. We mimic this approach using
the VSTOXX time series which is the VIX equivalent built upon the Dow Jones EUROSTOXX
50 Index.
Using the historical average V and the volatility σV of th VSTOXX from 2006 to 2018, we
res ale the PDs so hat both the magnitude and the sign of the index influence the probability
of default:
We illustrate the effect of applying this correction by looking at the 1-year PD curves as a
function of the age of the loan in two different points of the sample: on one hand, a moment
of economic bliss (2006Q4) at which the value of the volatility index was below its historical
average (but not further away than one standard deviation); on the other, we choose 2008Q4 as
an example of severe economic downturn as the VSTOXX reached its maximum value within
the time span considered. Figure 4 confirms that the inclusion of macroeconomic information
has non-negligible effects on the calculation of expected losses. Note that linking the calculation
of loss s to the evolution of a macroeconomic variable in such a w y implicitly introduces some
degree of procyclicality, although not linked to the nature of impairment accounting regime, as
we will discuss in subsequent sections of this paper.
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To calculate the lifetime expected loss in t we need, for each future period s until maturity,
the probability of default conditional on a unique non-default event in previous periods between
t and s. Indicating with Dk a default event in period k, the probability of a default in a future
period s conditional on the information set Ft available at time t < s is as follows:
PDs|Ft = p (Ds = 1, Dk = 0; t ≤ k ≤ s) = PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) (7)
The lifetime PD in t is simply the probability of observing a default in any of the future time
periods, conditional on the information in t:
PDLifet =
M∑
s=t
PDs|Ft = PDt +
M∑
s=t+1
PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) (8)
It follows immediately that the lifetime PD is always higher than the single-period PD and
converges to it as the loan approaches maturity.
Following the logic explained above, PDt is calculated for each age of a loan using EDW
data (as in Figure 5). Given the limited number of defaults in the EDW dataset, we lack the
amount of data necessary to calculate how this relation changed over time and assume a single
curve for all periods.
The PDs for each age are subsequently multiplied in each period by a coefficient which
ensures that the weighted average PD of the portfolio equals the default rate calculated from
the Italian credit register.
Figure 5: Lifetime versus one-period PD.
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4.1.4. Expected loss
The one-period expected loss is defined as the product of the exposure times the PD and the
LGD. However, in calculating lifetime provisions, the lifetime expected loss (using the proper
discount rate) is the suitable measurement. Following the same logic as in the PD case, the
lifetime expected loss in period t for a loan with contractual maturity M is merely defined as
the sum of current and future one-period expected losses.
To calculate the lifetime expected loss in t we need, for each future period s until maturity,
the probability of default conditional on no default event in previous periods between t and s22.
The formula for the expected loss over the residual lifetime of the loan can then be written as:
ELt+1,M ≡
M∑
s=t+1
ELs =
M∑
s=t+1
EADs · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t)
=
M∑
s=t+1
EADs · LGDs · PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) · (1 + r)−(s−t)
(9)
As in the case of the PD, compared to the one-period EL, the lifetime EL not only is higher
but monotonically decreasing as the loan ages (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Lifetime versus one-period expected loss.
4.2. Impact on P&L: provisions and realized losses
In calculating the impact on the profit and loss account we follow the approach defined by the
accounting practice (GPPC, 2016), that is, we calculate provisions and realized losses through
the PD, LGD and EAD for each year. In this section, the basis time unit t is the quarter and
financial institutions are supposed to account for provisions and losses on a quarterly basis.
22Here again, we exclude the possibility of multiple defaults.
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To calculate the lifetime expected loss in t we need, for each future period s until maturity,
the probability of default conditional on a unique non-default event in previous periods between
t and s. Indicating wi h Dk default event in period k, t e probability of a default in a future
period s conditional on the information set Ft available at time t < s is as follows:
PDs|Ft = p (Ds = 1, Dk = 0; t ≤ k ≤ s) = PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) (7)
The lifetime PD in t is simply the probability of observing a default in any of the future time
periods, conditional on the information in t:
PDLifet =
M∑
s=t
PDs|Ft = PDt +
M∑
s=t+1
PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) (8)
It follows immediately that the lif time PD is always igher than the si gle-period PD and
converges to it as the loan approaches maturity.
Following the logic explained above, PDt is calculated for each age of a loan using EDW
data (as in Figure 5). Giv n th limited number of defaults in the EDW dataset, we l ck the
amount of data nec ssary t calcul te how this relation chang d ver time and assume single
curve for all pe iods.
The PDs for each age are subsequently multiplied in each period by a coefficient which
ensures that the weighted average PD of the portfolio equals the default rate calculated from
the Italian credit register.
Figure 5: Lifetime versus one-period PD.
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4.1.4. Expected loss
The one-period expected loss is defined as the product of the exposure times the PD and the
LGD. However, in calculating lifetime provisions, the lifetime expected loss (using the proper
discount rate) is the suitable measurement. Following the same logic as in the PD case, the
lifetime expected loss in period t for a loan with contractual maturity M is merely defined as
the sum of current and future one-period expected losses.
To calculate the lifetime expected loss in t we need, for each future period s until maturity,
the probability of default conditional on no default event in previous periods between t and s22.
The formula for the expected loss over the residual lifetime of the loan can then be written as:
ELt+1,M ≡
M∑
s=t+1
ELs =
M∑
s=t+1
EADs · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t)
=
M∑
s=t+1
EADs · LGDs · PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) · (1 + r)−(s−t)
(9)
As in the case of the PD, compared to the one-period EL, the lifetime EL not only is higher
but monotonically decreasing as the loan ages (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Lifetime versus one-period expected loss.
4.2. Impact on P&L: provisions and realized losses
In calculating the impact on the profit and loss account we follow the approach defined by the
accounting practice (GPPC, 2016), that is, we calculate provisions and realized losses through
the PD, LGD and EAD for each year. In this section, the basis time unit t is the quarter and
financial institutions are supposed to account for provisions and losses on a quarterly basis.
22Here again, we exclude the possibility of multiple defaults.
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4.2.1. IAS 39
Under IAS 39 there are no provisions, neither at inception nor for any given year; each
period s total negative impact on the profit and loss account (PLt) is required to equal realized
losses. Assuming that the loss appears when there is a default, the P&L under IAS 39 would
be:
PLIAS 39t = EADt ·DRt · LGDt (10)
where DRt is the realized default rate in t. However, since the loss appears well after the
default, this formula is just an approximation. As we will state afterwards, for simplicity in this
paper we will assume that the loss from a default is split equally across the following six years.
4.2.2. IFRS 9
Under the perfect forecast assumption, losses in each period are fully compensated with
previous year provisions. Again, assuming the loss appears when there is a default, the negative
impact on P&L from Stage 1 loans would be just equal to the losses expected for the following
year:
PLS1t = EL
S1
t+1,t+4 =
t+4∑
s=t+1
ELS1s =
t+4∑
s=t+1
EADS1s · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t) (11)
As in the previous case, since the loss appears well after default this formula is just an
approximation.
If there is a significant risk increase, loans pass to Stage 2 status and the full lifetime expected
loss must be recognized. We use a proxy of the 30-day past due status as a trigger for the
transition from Stage 1. According to IFRS 9 dispositions, a (rebuttable) presumption exists
that 30-days past due status represents a significant increase in the risk qualifier for loans.
Unfortunately, data on payments past due less than 90 days is not available from the Italian
Credit Register. However, assuming that payments become past due with uniform probability
within each quarter, approximately two thirds of the 90-day past due loans at the end of a
quarter would already be 30-day past due by the end of the previous quarter. We assume as a
rough approximation that two thirds of the loans to be defaulted in t+1 show a significant risk
increase in t, that is:
EADS2t =
2
3
· EADS3t+1
However, this assumption does not embrace loans that temporarily shift from Stage 1 to
Stage 2 and vice-versa; in subsequent sections of the paper, we explore alternative formulations
that account for migrations from and to Stage 2. Assuming the loss is discovered when there is
a default, the impact on P&L from loans in Stage 2 is:
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PLS2t =
M∑
s=t+1
ELS2s =
M∑
s=t+1
EADS2s · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t)
=
M∑
s=t+1
EADS2s · LGDs · PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) · (1 + r)−(s−t)
(12)
where M is the exposure maturity and Ft the information set in t.
The impact on P&L from Stage 1 and Stage 2 exposures comes therefore in terms of provisions
for future losses:
PLS1t + PL
S2
t = Prov
IFRS 9
t
For loans in Stage 3 default is certain (PDt = 1), and a loss must be accounted for in P&L.
The corresponding provisions already made in the previous periods, on the other hand, must be
cancelled. Under the assumption of perfect forecast, in every period realized losses correspond
to the expectations of the previous periods and the two quantities offset each other.
PLS3t = Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods = 0 (13)
Since we have assumed perfect forecasting ability, the sum of losses realized in any period
will exactly offset previous year s provisions, short of a difference due to discount unwinding.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no flow of loans back from Stage 2 to Stage
1. Under these assumptions the impact in P&L from Stage 3 is zero.
Summing up, under our assumption the impact on P&L in each period under IFRS 9 is
therefore equal to the sum of one-year expected losses for loans in Stage 1 and of lifetime
expected losses for loans in Stage 2:
PLIFRS 9t = Prov
IFRS 9
t +
(
Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods
)
= PLS1t + PL
S2
t (14)
4.2.3. US GAAP
In order to replicate the approach devised by the FASB we recognize the full lifetime expected
loss of each loan at inception. We model the impact on P&L under US GAAP under three
different assumptions on how financial institutions incorporate new information in the estimates
for lifetime ECL:
1. Future loss rates are known (“perfect forecast”);
2. Future loss rates are known up to a one-year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the sample average;
3. Future loss rates are known up to a one-year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the average of the previous five years.
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period s total ne ative impact on the profit and loss account (PL ) is required to equal realize
losses. Assuming that the loss appears when there is a default, he P&L under IAS 39 would
be:
PLIAS 39t = EADt ·DRt · LGDt (10)
where DRt is the realized default rate i t. However, since the loss appears well after the
default, this form la is just an approxi ation. As we will state afterwards, for simplicity in this
paper we will assume that the loss fro a default is split equally across the following six years.
4.2.2. IFRS 9
Under the perfect forecast as umption, losse in ch period a fully compensated w th
previous year provisions. Again, a suming the loss appears when ther is a d fault, the negative
impact on P&L from Stage 1 loans would be just equal to the losses expected for the following
year:
PLS1t = EL
S1
t+1,t+4 =
t+4∑
s=t+1
ELS1s =
t+4∑
s=t+1
EADS1s · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t) (11)
As in the previous case, since the loss appears well after default this formula is just an
approximat on.
If there is a significant risk incre se, loans pass to Stage 2 status and the full lifet me expec ed
loss must be recognized. We use a proxy of the 30-day past due s tus as a trigger for the
r nsition from S age 1. Acco ding to IFRS 9 disposit ons, a (rebuttable) presumpti n exists
that 30-days past due st tus represents a significa t increase i he r sk qualifier for loans.
Unfor unately, data on payments past due less than 90 days i not available ro the Italian
Credit Register. However, assuming hat payments b come past due with unifor probability
within each qua ter, approximately two thirds of the 90-day past due loans at the end of
quarter would already be 30-day pa t due by the end of the prev ous quarter. We assume as a
rough approxim ion that two thirds of the loans to be defaulted in t+1 show a significant risk
increase in t, that is:
EADS2t =
2
3
· EADS3t+1
However, this as umption does not embrace loans that t mporarily shift from Stage 1 to
St ge 2 and vice-vers ; n ubseque t sections of the paper, we explore alternative formulation
that ccount for migrations from and to Stage 2. Assuming the loss is discovered when there is
a default, the impact on P&L from loans in Stage 2 is:
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PLS2t =
M∑
s=t+1
ELS2s =
M∑
s=t+1
EADS2s · LGDs · PDs|Ft · (1 + r)−(s−t)
=
M∑
s=t+1
EADS2s · LGDs · PDs
s−1∏
k=t
(1− PDk) · (1 + r)−(s−t)
(12)
where M is the exposure maturity and Ft the information set in t.
The impact on P&L from Stage 1 and Stage 2 exposures comes therefore in terms of provisions
for future losses:
PLS1t + PL
S2
t = Prov
IFRS 9
t
For loans in Stage 3 default is certain (PDt = 1), and a loss must be accounted for in P&L.
The corresponding provisions already made in the previous periods, on the other hand, must be
cancelled. Under the assumption of perfect forecast, in every period realized losses correspond
to the expectations of the previous periods and the two quantities offset each other.
PLS3t = Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods = 0 (13)
Since we have assumed perfect forecasting ability, the sum of losses realized in any period
will exactly offset previous year s provisions, short of a difference due to discount unwinding.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no flow of loans back from Stage 2 to Stage
1. Under these assumptions the impact in P&L from Stage 3 is zero.
Summing up, under our assumption the impact on P&L in each period under IFRS 9 is
therefore equal to the sum of one-year expected losses for loans in Stage 1 and of lifetime
expected losses for loans in Stage 2:
PLIFRS 9t = Prov
IFRS 9
t +
(
Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods
)
= PLS1t + PL
S2
t (14)
4.2.3. US GAAP
In order to replicate the approach devised by the FASB we recognize the full lifetime expected
loss of each loan at inception. We model the impact on P&L under US GAAP under three
different assumptions on how financial institutions incorporate new information in the estimates
for lifetime ECL:
1. Future loss rates are known (“perfect forecast”);
2. Future loss rates are known up to a one-year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the sample average;
3. Future loss rates are known up to a one-year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the average of the previous five years.
20When we assume that financial institutions can perfectly forecast future losses, the sum of
realized losses in the subsequent periods will exactly offset the provisions in year one. Therefore,
the impact on P&L in each period will equal to the lifetime expected loss for the newly originated
loans and is obtained by replacing the EAD with the volume of new loans in equation (10).
Under the alternative assumptions where the perfect forecast horizon is limited to one year23
(after which financial institutions either assume that PD will revert to the historical sample
average levels or to the average of the last five years), in addition to the provisions for new loans
in each period there will be a positive or negative impact from the provisions on older loans,
for which the expectation on the loss for the residual lifetime changes in response to the new
information available. The new value of the lifetime ECL for old loans tends to increase during
crisis times, partially offsetting the reduction in overall provisions implied by the lower flow of
new loans.
Which of the two effects will prevail is crucially contingent upon how financial institutions
update their expectations on future losses. Under our assumption an increase in loss rates is
seen as transitory and the latter are assumed to revert to some average value, which results
in a limited effect that only partially offset the opposite dynamic driven by the provisions on
new loans. If financial institutions assume longer persistence of loss rates values, the changes in
provisions for old loans tend to prevail.
4.3. Methodological assumptions
In order to calculate the impact on procyclicality we were forced to make a number of
assumptions to simplify our model. Although some of them have already been mentioned, in
this section we explore the most relevant ones trying to highlight their potential impact. Besides,
we would like all these restrictions to be borne in mind when extrapolating policy conclusions
from our paper.
Stage 2 and “cliff effect”
As mentioned, when designing the impact of the significant increase in credit risk and its
cliff effect we were forced to make two consecutive simplifications. We link the Stage 1 to
Stage 2 transition to the 30-day past due rebuttable assumption. This simplification is heavily
rooted on the IFRS 9 being the only common and purely objective criterion. Thus, regulation
itself assumes the delay in payments as the most evident predictor of the rest of triggers (e.g.
forbearance, increase in PD...).
Since our database did not have any information on which loans were 30 days past due we
were forced to use a proxy. We assumed an even distribution of the 90 days past due loans as
described in the previous section. This is another difference with respect to Abad and Sua´rez
(2017) since they model the cliff effect by means of the transition matrix. Based on their data
we have every reason to believe that the delay in payment will be even more procyclical than
default itself.
23We keep one year of perfect forecast in order to ease the comparison with the results for IFRS 9.
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where M is the exposure maturity and Ft the information set in t.
The impact on P&L from Stage 1 and Stage 2 exposures comes therefore in terms of provisions
for future losses:
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For loans in Stage 3 default is certain (PDt = 1), and a loss must be accounted for in P&L.
The corresponding provisions already made in the previous periods, on the other hand, must be
cancelled. Under the assumption of perfect forecast, in every period realized losses correspond
to the expectations of the previous periods and the two quantities offset each other.
PLS3t = Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods = 0 (13)
Since we have assumed perfect forecasting ability, the sum of losses realized in any period
will exactly offset previous year s provisions, short of a difference due to discount unwinding.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no flow of loans back from Stage 2 to Stage
1. Under these assumptions the impact in P&L from Stage 3 is zero.
Summing up, under our assumption the impact on P&L in each period under IFRS 9 is
therefore equal to the sum of one-year expected losses for loans in Stage 1 and of lifetime
expected losses for loans in Stage 2:
PLIFRS 9t = Prov
IFRS 9
t +
(
Losst − ProvIFRS 9Previous periods
)
= PLS1t + PL
S2
t (14)
4.2.3. US GAAP
In order to replicate the approach devised by the FASB we recognize the full lifetime expected
loss of each loan at inception. We model the impact on P&L under US GAAP under three
different assumptions on how financial institutions incorporate new information in the estimates
for lifetime ECL:
1. Future loss rates are known (“perfect forecast”);
2. l u to a one-year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the sample average;
3. Future loss at s are known up to a on -year horizon in the future, after which they are
assumed to revert to the average of the previous five years.
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When we assume that financial institutions can perfectly forecast future losses, the sum of
realized losses in the subsequent periods will exactly offset the provisions in year one. Therefore,
the impact on P&L in each period will equal to the lifetime expected loss for the newly originated
loans and is obtained by replacing the EAD with the volume of new loans in equation (10).
Under the alternative assumptions where the perfect forecast horizon is limited to one year23
(after which financial institutions either assume that PD will revert to the historical sample
average levels or to the average of the last five years), in addition to the provisions for new loans
in each period there will be a positive or negative impact from the provisions on older loans,
for which the expectation on the loss for the residual lifetime changes in response to the new
information available. The new value of the lifetime ECL for old loans tends to increase during
crisis times, partially offsetting the reduction in overall provisions implied by the lower flow of
new loans.
Which of the two effects will prevail is crucially contingent upon how financial institutions
update their expectations on future losses. Under our assumption an increase in loss rates is
seen as transitory and the latter are assumed to revert to some average value, which results
in a limited effect that only partially offset the opposite dynamic driven by the provisions on
new loans. If financi l institutions assume longer persistence of l ss rates values, the changes in
provisions for old lo ns tend to prevail.
4.3. M thodological assumptio s
In order to calculate the impact on procyclicality we were forced to make a number of
assumptions t simplify our model. Although some of them have already been mentioned, in
this section we explore the most relevant ones trying to highlight their potential impact. Besides,
we would like all these restrictions to be borne in mind when extrapolating policy conclusions
from o r paper.
Stage 2 and “cliff effect”
As mentioned, when designing the impact of the significant increase in credit risk and its
cliff effect we were forced to make two consecutive simplifications. We link the Stage 1 to
Stage 2 transition to the 30-day past due rebuttable assumption. This simplification is heavily
rooted on the IFRS 9 being the only common and purely objective criterion. Thus, regulation
itself assumes the delay in payments as the most evident predictor of the rest of triggers (e.g.
forbearance, increase in PD...).
Since our database did not have any information on which loans were 30 days past due we
were forced to use a proxy. We assumed an even distribution of the 90 days past due loans as
described in the previous section. This is another difference with respect to Abad and Sua´rez
(2017) since they model the cliff effect by means of the transition matrix. Based on their data
we have every reason to believe that the delay in payment will be even more procyclical than
default itself.
23We keep one year of perfect forecast in order to ease the comparison with the results for IFRS 9.
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When we assume that financial institutions can perfectly forecast future losses, the sum of
realized losses in the subsequent periods will exactly offset the provisions in year one. Therefore,
the impact on P&L in each period will equal to the lifetime expected loss for the newly originated
loans and is obtained by replacing the EAD with the volume of new loans in equation (10).
Under the alternative assumptions where the perfect forecast horizon is limited to one year23
(after which financial institutions either assume that PD will revert to the historical sample
average levels or to the average of the last five years), in addition to the provisions for new loans
in each period there will be a positive or negative impact from the provisions on older loans,
for which the expectation on the loss for the residual lifetime changes in response to the new
information available. The new value of the lifetime ECL for old loans tends to increase during
crisis times, partially offsetting the reduction in overall provisions implied by the lower flow of
new loans.
Which of the two effects will prevail is crucially contingent upon how financial institutions
update their expectations on future losses. Under our assumption an increase in loss rates is
seen as transitory and the latter are assumed to revert to some average value, which results
in a limited effect that only partially offset the opposite dynamic driven by the provisions on
new loans. If financial institutions assume longer persistence of loss rates values, the changes in
provisions for old loans tend to prevail.
4.3. Methodological assumptions
In order to calculate the impact on procyclicality we were forced to make a number of
assumptions to simplify our model. Although some of them have already been mentioned, in
this section we explore the most relevant ones trying to highlight their potential impact. Besides,
we would like all these restrictions to be borne in mind when extrapolating policy conclusions
from our paper.
Stage 2 and “cliff effect”
As mentioned, when designing the impact of the significant increase in credit risk and its
cliff effect we were forced to make two consecutive simplifications. We link the Stage 1 to
Stage 2 transition to the 30-day past due rebuttable assumption. This simplification is heavily
rooted on the IFRS 9 being the only common and purely objective criterion. Thus, regulation
itself assumes the delay in payments as the most evident predictor of the rest of triggers (e.g.
forbearance, increase in PD...).
Since our database did not have any information on which loans were 30 days past due we
were forced to use a proxy. We assumed an even distribution of the 90 days past due loans as
described in the previous section. This is another difference with respect to Abad and Sua´rez
(2017) since they model the cliff effect by means of the transition matrix. Based on their data
we have every reason to believe that the delay in payment will be even more procyclical than
default itself.
23We keep one year of perfect forecast in order to ease the comparison with the results for IFRS 9.
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Perfect forecast
Since we use an ex post database including observations from the latest economic crisis, one
of the modelling options we compare is based on perfect forecast. That is, we test the different
accounting regimes assuming that provisioning models can exactly predict future outcomes. We
fully acknowledge that actual models will be subject to real data availability and thus, perfect
forecast is not compatible with “real life”. However, for comparison purposes we see merit in
removing all other practical considerations from credit risk models.
Lag between default events and loss recognition
The timing with which credit losses are recognized can be constrained to a varying degree
by accounting rules, but also depends on the actual speed with which the loss associated with
a non-performing exposure becomes known, on the length of recovery procedures, and to some
extent on discretion. There is abundant evidence in the literature on the tendency for financial
intermediaries to procrastinate loss recognition in the context of crises, as shown in Stoian and
Norden (2013), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015a) and IMF (2015).
Modelling how these factors affect the timing of loss recognition is beyond the scope of this
paper. For simplicity, we assume that it takes some time to realise the full extent of the loss on a
non-performing loan (this can be interpreted as a progressive deterioration in credit quality): if
required to recognise realised losses, under this assumption a financial intermediary would split
the loss equally across the six years following the default event24.
Independence between accounting regime and loan supply
For modelling purposes, we assume independence between the accounting regime and loan
supply. This hypothesis is established in order to be able to compare the two models and
because there is no clear knowledge on how much the accounting model will impact credit supply.
However, we fully acknowledge that the different P&L impacts might tailor banks behavior. In
fact, one of the conclusions of this paper is the different cyclical impact of the accounting regimes.
5. Results
Based on the methodology and parameters described, in this section we have simulated what
the shapes of provisions plus realized losses would have been for a simulated portfolio of Italian
mortgages from 2006 to 2018. We do not assess the impact of regulatory changes given the
current conditions of the financial system; instead, we study the dynamics of provisions and
losses in a scenario where the effects of the transition to the new rules have been completely
absorbed25.
Assumptions on the exposures at default, LGDs and loan-to-value ratios were already de-
tailed in the previous section. Related to PD, we will use average default rates from the Italian
24This number of years is roughly coherent with evidence on the average time needed to obtain the recoverable
value in foreclosures procedures in Italy; see Carpinelli et al. (2016).
25In this spirit, Figure 7 does not show the provisions made in the first period of existence of the fictional
portfolio, which correspond to the initial value of the stocks of provisions in Figure 6.
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the impact on P&L in each period will equal to the lifetime expected loss for the newly originated
loans and is obtained by replacing the EAD with the volume of new loans in equation (10).
Under the alternative assumptions where the perfect forecast horizon is limited to one year23
(after which financial institutions either assume that PD will revert to the historical sample
average levels or to the average of the last five years), in addition to the provisions for new loans
in each period there will be a positive or negative impact from the provisions on older loans,
for which the expectation on the loss for the residual lifetime changes in response to the new
information available. The new value of the lifetime ECL for old loans tends to increase during
crisis times, partially offsetting the reduction in overall provisions implied by the lower flow of
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in a limited effect that only partially offset the opposite dynamic driven by the provisions on
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As mentioned, when designing the impact of the significant increase in credit risk and its
cliff effect we were forced to make two consecutive simplifications. We link the Stage 1 to
Stage 2 transition to the 30-day past due rebuttable assumption. This simplification is heavily
rooted on the IFRS 9 being the only common and purely objective criterion. Thus, regulation
itself assumes the delay in payments as the most evident predictor of the rest of triggers (e.g.
forbearance, increase in PD...).
Since our database did not have any information on which loans were 30 days past due we
were forced to use a proxy. We assumed an even distribution of the 90 days past due loans as
described in the previous section. This is another difference with respect to Abad and Sua´rez
(2017) since they model the cliff effect by means of the transition matrix. Based on their data
we have every reason to believe that the delay in payment will be even more procyclical than
default itself.
23We keep one year of perfect forecast in order to ease the comparison with the results for IFRS 9.
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Perfect forecast
Since we use an ex post database including observations from the latest economic crisis, one
of the modelling options we compare is based on perfect forecast. That is, we test the different
accounting regimes assuming that provisioning models can exactly predict future outcomes. We
fully acknowledge that actual models will be subject to real data availability and thus, perfect
forecast is not compatible with “real life”. However, for comparison purposes we see merit in
removing all other practical considerations from credit risk models.
Lag between default events and loss recognition
The timing with which credit losses are recognized can be constrained to a varying degree
by accounting rules, but also depends on the actual speed with which the loss associated with
a non-performing exposure becomes known, on the length of recovery procedures, and to some
extent on discretion. There is abundant evidence in the literature on the tendency for financial
intermediaries to procrastinate loss recognition in the context of crises, as shown in Stoian and
Norden (2013), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015a) and IMF (2015).
Modelling how these factors affect the timing of loss recognition is beyond the scope of this
paper. For simplicity, we assume that it takes some time to realise the full extent of the loss on a
non-performing loan (this can be interpreted as a progressive deterioration in credit quality): if
required to recognise realised losses, under this assumption a financial intermediary would split
the loss equally across the six years following the default event24.
Independence between accounting regime and loan supply
For modelling purposes, we assume independence between the accounting regime and loan
supply. This hypothesis is established in order to be able to compare the two models and
because there is no clear knowledge on how much the accounting model will impact credit supply.
However, we fully acknowledge that the different P&L impacts might tailor banks behavior. In
fact, one of the conclusions of this paper is the different cyclical impact of the accounting regimes.
5. Results
Based on the methodology and parameters described, in this section we have simulated what
the shapes of provisions plus realized losses would have been for a simulated portfolio of Italian
mortgages from 2006 to 2018. We do not assess the impact of regulatory changes given the
current conditions of the financial system; instead, we study the dynamics of provisions and
losses in a scenario where the effects of the transition to the new rules have been completely
absorbed25.
Assumptions on the exposures at default, LGDs and loan-to-value ratios were already de-
tailed in the previous section. Related to PD, we will use average default rates from the Italian
24This number of years is roughly coherent with evidence on the average time needed to obtain the recoverable
value in foreclosures procedures in Italy; see Carpinelli et al. (2016).
25In this spirit, Figure 7 does not show the provisions made in the first period of existence of the fictional
portfolio, which correspond to the initial value of the stocks of provisions in Figure 6.
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credit register as averages for each period, whereas the relationship between the PD and the age
of the loan is estimated from the European Data Warehouse (EDW).
Using this fictional portfolio, Figure 7 depicts the sum of realized losses plus net provisions,
i.e. the impact on P&L in each period under all three accounting regimes (IAS 39, IFRS 9 and
US GAAP). For US GAAP, we show the result for the three alternative assumptions presented
in the previous section.
Under the perfect forecast assumption, for US GAAP realized losses are always provisioned
in advance (at loan origination). If there were no delay between default and write-off, the realised
losses curve also would correspond to the total impact on P&L in each period under IAS 39.
However, since this delay exists and we have assumed that the loss from a default is split equally
across the following six years, under IAS 39 losses are recognized well after default.
Variation of P&L (realized losses plus net provisions) under the different accounting regimes, over an historical scenario
for mortgage defaults and new loan volumes
Figure 7: Impact on P&L.
With IFRS 9, provisions anticipate default by one year (Figure 7). Under the perfect forecast
assumption, in fact, Stage 1 provisions represent exactly the following year s realized losses if
losses took place at the same time of default, whereas under our assumptions the amounts
of exposure in Stage 2 have a relatively small effect26. In other words, as we will analyze
below, IFRS 9 seems much less procyclical than the previous IAS 39 regime (in the sense of
contemporaneous correlation with realized losses). This is a major improvement with respect to
IFRS 9 since under IAS 39 losses are recognized once they take place, sometimes too long after
default, whereas under IFRS 9 they are recognized one year before default. However, the impact
on P&L barely anticipates actual losses by one year, which may be an insufficient amount of
time to build up reserves and the business cycle may already have entered the downturn phase.
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Our set of assumptions entails that th imp ct of the “cliff effect” from Stage 2 provisions
is almost negligible, since the assets migrate toward a different stage within one quarter. More
conservative assumptions about the conditions to classify assets in Stage 2 may lead to a higher
amount of provisions being frontloaded when credit quality starts deteriorating. However, to
the best of our knowledge, it seems that the cliff effect will always be close in time to defaults,
which may worsen rather than reduce the procyclical effects of losses. So, based on these results
it appears that while IFRS 9 is an advance with respect to previous regulation (IAS 39), there
could be some room for improvement.
Under US GAAP, due to the fact that we have assumed independence between the accounting
regime and loan supply, since provisions are granted at inception and there is a clear negative
correlation between volumes of new granted loans and default rates, the impact on P&L is
negatively related to contemporaneous default rates. The reason behind this result is that under
US GAAP provisions tend to be accumulated during boom phases of the credit cycle, when new
loans volumes are higher: losses that will occur during crises are recognized in advance and
provis ons are p ogressively released when cr dit quality deteriorates.
The effect described above is stronger with perfect forecast, while when loss rates are esti-
mated t be more pe siste t in time (the other wo cases for US GAAP, indicated by the dotte
and the dashed line in Figure 7) the effect of updating expectations on future losses for older
loans tends to co pensate the decr ase in new loans. Wit out perfect fo ecast, in fact, losse in
times of crisis could exceed provisions granted at inception based on the lifetime expected loss,
if the future default and recovery rates were severely underestimated. Nevertheless, even if the
perfect forecast horizon is limited to one-year, cyclicality under US GAAP is much lower than
under IFRS 9. The results, thus, appear still valid under the assumption that expectations are
overly optimistic in risk assessments during boom times.
Finally, notice that the level of provisions (see Figure 8) is much higher under US GAAP
(between 1.5% and 2.5% of performing exposure) than under IFRS 9 (approximately 0.25%).
This is not surprising since under US GAAP the entire expected lifetime loss is provisioned at
inception, whereas in IFRS 9 financial institutions are required to provision only the following
year expected loss plus the lifetime expected loss for the loans that show a significant increase
in risk.
Figure 8: Stock of provisions.
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credit register as averages for each period, whereas the relationship between the PD and the age
of the loan is estimated from the European Data Warehouse (EDW).
Using this fictional portfolio, Figure 7 depicts the sum of realized losses plus net provisions,
i.e. the impact on P&L in each period under all three accounting regimes (IAS 39, IFRS 9 and
US GAAP). For US GAAP, we show the result for the three alternative assumptions presented
in the previous section.
Under the perfect forecast assumption, for US GAAP realized losses are always provisioned
in advance (at loan origination). If there were no delay between default and write-off, the realised
losses curve also would correspond to the total impact on P&L in each period under IAS 39.
However, since this delay exists and we have assumed that the loss from a default is split equally
across the following six years, under IAS 39 losses are recognized well after default.
Variation of P&L (realized losses plus net provisions) under the different accounting regimes, over an historical scenario
for mortgage defaults and new loan volumes
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With IFRS 9, provisions anticipate default by one year (Figure 7). Under the perfect forecast
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losses took place at the same time of default, whereas under our assumptions the amounts
of exposure in Stage 2 have a relatively small effect26. In other words, as we will analyze
below, IFRS 9 seems much less procyclical than the previous IAS 39 regime (in the sense of
contemporaneous correlation with realized losses). This is a major improvement with respect to
IFRS 9 since under IAS 39 losses are recognized once they take place, sometimes too long after
default, whereas under IFRS 9 they are recognized one year before default. However, the impact
on P&L barely anticipates actual losses by one year, which may be an insufficient amount of
time to build up reserves and the business cycle may already have entered the downturn phase.
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The “cliff effect” from Stage 2 loans in their model is therefore much bigger and determines a strong response of
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Our set of assumptions entails that the impact of the “cliff effect” from Stage 2 provisions
is almost negligible, since the assets migrate toward a different stage within one quarter. More
conservative assumptions about the conditions to classify assets in Stage 2 may lead to a higher
amount of provisions being frontloaded when credit quality starts deteriorating. However, to
the best of our knowledge, it seems that the cliff effect will always be close in time to defaults,
which may worsen rather than reduce the procyclical effects of losses. So, based on these results
it appears that while IFRS 9 is an advance with respect to previous regulation (IAS 39), there
could be some room for improvement.
Under US GAAP, due to the fact that we have assumed independence between the accounting
regime and loan supply, since provisions are granted at inception and there is a clear negative
correlation between volumes of new granted loans and default rates, the impact on P&L is
negatively related to contemporaneous default rates. The reason behind this result is that under
US GAAP provisions tend to be accumulated during boom phases of the credit cycle, when new
loans volumes are higher: losses that will occur during crises are recognized in advance and
provisions are progressively released when credit quality deteriorates.
The effect described above is stronger with perfect forecast, while when loss rates are esti-
mated to be more persistent in time (the other two cases for US GAAP, indicated by the dotted
and the dashed line in Figure 7) the effect of updating expectations on future losses for older
loans tends to compensate the decrease in new loans. Without perfect forecast, in fact, losses in
times of crisis could exceed provisions granted at inception based on the lifetime expected loss,
if the future default and recovery rates were severely underestimated. Nevertheless, even if the
perfect forecast horizon is limited to one-year, cyclicality under US GAAP is much lower than
under IFRS 9. The results, thus, appear still valid under the assumption that expectations are
overly optimistic in risk assessments during boom times.
Finally, notice that the level of provisions (see Figure 8) is much higher under US GAAP
(between 1.5% and 2.5% of performing exposure) than under IFRS 9 (approximately 0.25%).
This is not surprising since under US GAAP the entire expected lifetime loss is provisioned at
inception, whereas in IFRS 9 financial institutions are required to provision only the following
year expected loss plus the lifetime expected loss for the loans that show a significant increase
in risk.
Figure 8: Stock of provisions.
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To confirm these intuitions about procyclicality that we draw from the previous graphs, in
the following subsection we present a statistical procedure to measure procyclicality. However,
it is worth noting that our results are based on our assumptions and, although these are reason-
able and robustness checks will be carried out below, we should be cautious about the policy
conclusions that can be extracted from these results.
5.1. Procyclicality
In the context of this paper, procyclicality is defined as the correlation with the contempora-
neous evolution of credit quality, proxied by realised losses. However, procyclicality can also be
defined in terms of correlation with macroeconomic variables, usually with GDP. Credit quality,
in turn, tends to be strongly related to credit supply and the business cycle so we do not expect
significant differences in both calculations, which justifies our use of the word “procyclical” in
the former sense.
Following Paredes et al. (2014), we use dynamic cross-correlation functions to measure
procyclicality. Tables 1 and 2 report the unconditional correlations between the impact on P&L
and the realized losses as well as Italian GDP under different accounting regimes. Following
standard practice, we measure the comovement between two series using the cross-correlation
function (henceforth CCF). Each row of Tables 1 and 2 displays the CCF between the impact
on P&L (net provisions and realized losses) under different accounting regimes at time t ± k,
and, realized losses as well as Italian GDP at time t.
Lags/Leads IFRS 9 US GAAP (a) US GAAP (b) US GAAP (c)
-8 45.2 6 16.6 34.8
-7 48.4 5 17.9 36.6
-6 51.6 3.9 19.8 38.8
-5 53.9 2.8 21.8 41.1
-4 55.3 1.9 24.1 43.6
-3 56.1 1.2 26.6 46.3
-2 55.5 0.4 29 48.8
-1 53.7 -0.6 30.6 50.6
0 52.3 -0.9 31.9 51.9
1 50.3 -2.3 31.1 51.5
2 48.8 -3.1 30 50.8
3 48.1 -3.2 29.1 50
4 48.1 -3.2 28.4 49.3
5 48.2 -2.8 28 48.6
6 48.7 -2 28 48.1
7 50.2 -0.8 28.7 48.2
8 50.3 -0.1 29.6 48.2
Unconditional correlations between the impact on P&L and losses. For US GAAP: (a) Future loss rates are known
(“perfect forecast”); (b) Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future, then revert to the sample average;
(c) Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future, then revert to the average of the previous five years.
Table 1: Cross-correlation functions: P&L with realized losses.
It can be inferred from the previous section that the impact in P&L from IFRS 9 presents
positive and strong contemporaneous correlation with realized losses and increases to roughly
55% with four lags (one year). Table 1, therefore, confirms the intuition that IFRS 9 provisions
input future realized losses to P&L approximately four quarters in advance: the impact of Stage
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55% with four lags (one year). Table 1, therefore, confirms the intuition that IFRS 9 provisions
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2 provisions is minimal, under our assumptions27. Consequently, as stated above, IFRS 9 appears
less procyclical than the previous IAS 39 regime, which is perfectly correlated with realized losses
by construction, but — even with perfect forecasting ability — provisions start rising only one
year before actual defaults. Thus, the impact on P&L is still likely to exert negative effects on
banks balance sheets at a point when the business cycle is starting to deteriorate.
Instead, confirming the previous section results, the impact in P&L from US GAAP and
realized losses present negative and non-negligible contemporaneous correlation in case (a),
entailing a negative correlation with the business cycle, which is a desirable property. In cases
(b) and (c) contemporaneous correlations are positive, but still significantly lower than under
IFRS 9 except for some leads in (c). These results are not totally unexpected since the purpose
of the introduction of ECL was to reduce procyclicality and US GAAP requires fully ECL
recognition since inception28.
We mentioned that credit quality tends to be strongly related to the business cycle; therefore,
if we repeat the exercise using Italian GDP instead of realized losses, we expect no major
differences. In general terms, Table 2 confirms this intuition. Firstly, taking into account lags
and forwards, IFRS 9 tends to be procyclical in the sense that realized losses net of provisions
tend to be higher when GDP is lower (negative, or almost zero, correlation). However, as
expected, in the case of US GAAP with perfect forecast, realized losses net of provisions tend
to be higher when GDP is higher (positive correlation), which is a desirable property.
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-5 -31.6 30.3 -4.3 -18.8
-4 -29.2 26.3 -11.9 -25.8
-3 -22 23.2 -17.7 -31.1
-2 -14.5 20.1 -21.6 -34.8
-1 -6.2 17.4 -22.6 -35.8
0 0.6 13.9 -21.1 -34.2
1 3.6 9.1 -19 -31.8
2 5.1 3.4 -17.2 -29.2
3 4.9 -3.7 -16.7 -27.3
4 3.4 -11.3 -18 -26.5
5 1.3 -18.1 -20.2 -26.5
6 -1.1 -23.9 -22.8 -26.6
7 -2.8 -28.8 -25.6 -26.8
8 -4.2 -33.8 -29.3 -27.8
Table 2: Cross-correlation functions: P&L with GDP.
Results related to US GAAP cases (b) and (c) are not totally unexpected considering what
is stated above. The effect of updating expectations on future losses for older loans in bad times
compensates the fact that during bad times banks grant less loans, creating a situation in which
realized losses net of provisions tend to be higher when GDP is lower.
27However, recall that our baseline assumption does not consider loans that temporarily shift from S1 to S2
and later on, instead of defaulting, recover their S1 status. Rating migrations data show that a non-negligible
amount of rated entities improve their rating every period, which would qualify for an S2 to S1 transition. Thus,
any results regarding the procyclicality induced by S2 loans should be understood as only a lower bound of the
potential, actual effects.
28See, for example, FSF (2009).
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To confirm these intuitions about procyclicality that we draw from the previous graphs, in
the following subsection we present a statistical procedure to measure procyclicality. However,
it is worth noting that our results are based on our assumptions and, although these are reason-
able and robustness checks will be carried out below, we should be cautious about the policy
conclusions that can be extracted from these results.
5.1. Procyclicality
In the context of this paper, procyclicality is defined as the correlation with the contempora-
neous evolution of credit quality, proxied by realised losses. However, procyclicality can also be
defined in terms of correlation with macroeconomic variables, usually with GDP. Credit quality,
in turn, tends to be strongly related to credit supply and the business cycle so we do not expect
significant differences in both calculations, which justifies our use of the word “procyclical” in
the former sense.
Following Paredes et al. (2014), we use dynamic cross-correlation functions to measure
procyclicality. Tables 1 and 2 report the unconditional correlations between the impact on P&L
and the realized losses as well as Italian GDP under different accounting regimes. Following
standard practice, we measure the comovement between two series using the cross-correlation
function (henceforth CCF). Each row of Tables 1 and 2 displays the CCF between the impact
on P&L (net provisions and realized losses) under different accounting regimes at time t ± k,
and, realized losses as well as Italian GDP at time t.
Lags/Leads IFRS 9 US GAAP (a) US GAAP (b) US GAAP (c)
-8 45.2 6 16.6 34.8
-7 48.4 5 17.9 36.6
-6 51.6 3.9 19.8 38.8
-5 53.9 2.8 21.8 41.1
-4 55.3 1.9 24.1 43.6
-3 56.1 1.2 26.6 46.3
-2 55.5 0.4 29 48.8
-1 53.7 -0.6 30.6 50.6
0 52.3 -0.9 31.9 51.9
1 50.3 -2.3 31.1 51.5
2 48.8 -3.1 30 50.8
3 48.1 -3.2 29.1 50
4 48.1 -3.2 28.4 49.3
5 48.2 -2.8 28 48.6
6 48.7 -2 28 48.1
7 50.2 -0.8 28.7 48.2
8 50.3 -0.1 29.6 48.2
Unconditional correlations between the impact on P&L and losses. For US GAAP: (a) Future loss rates are known
(“perfect forecast”); (b) Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future, then revert to the sample average;
(c) Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future, then revert to the average of the previous five years.
Table 1: Cross-correlat o functions: P&L wi h realiz d losses.
It can be inferred from the previous section that the impact in P&L from IFRS 9 presents
positive and strong contemporaneous correlation with realized losses and increases to roughly
55% with four lags (one year). Table 1, therefore, confirms the intuition that IFRS 9 provisions
input future realized losses to P&L approximately four quarters in advance: the impact of Stage
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2 provisions is minimal, under our assumptions27. Consequently, as stated above, IFRS 9 appears
less procyclical than the previous IAS 39 regime, which is perfectly correlated with realized losses
by construction, but — even with perfect forecasting ability — provisions start rising only one
year before actual defaults. Thus, the impact on P&L is still likely to exert negative effects on
banks balance sheets at a point when the business cycle is starting to deteriorate.
Instead, confirming the previous section results, the impact in P&L from US GAAP and
realized losses present negative and non-negligible contemporaneous correlation in case (a),
entailing a negative correlation with the business cycle, which is a desirable property. In cases
(b) and (c) contemporaneous correlations are positive, but still significantly lower than under
IFRS 9 except for some leads in (c). These results are not totally unexpected since the purpose
of the introduction of ECL was to reduce procyclicality and US GAAP requires fully ECL
recognition since inception28.
We mentioned that credit quality tends to be strongly related to the business cycle; therefore,
if we repeat the exercise using Italian GDP instead of realized losses, we expect no major
differences. In general terms, Table 2 confirms this intuition. Firstly, taking into account lags
and forwards, IFRS 9 tends to be procyclical in the sense that realized losses net of provisions
tend to be higher when GDP is lower (negative, or almost zero, correlation). However, as
expected, in the case of US GAAP with perfect forecast, realized losses net of provisions tend
to be higher when GDP is higher (positive correlation), which is a desirable property.
Lags/Leads IFRS 9 US GAAP (a) US GAAP (b) US GAAP (c)
-8 -23.5 43.3 19.3 2.6
-7 -29 38.2 11.3 -4.6
-6 -31.9 33.8 3.1 -12
-5 -31.6 30.3 -4.3 -18.8
-4 -29.2 26.3 -11.9 -25.8
-3 -22 23.2 -17.7 -31.1
-2 -14.5 20.1 -21.6 -34.8
-1 -6.2 17.4 -22.6 -35.8
0 0.6 13.9 -21.1 -34.2
1 3.6 9.1 -19 -31.8
2 5.1 3.4 -17.2 -29.2
3 4.9 -3.7 -16.7 -27.3
4 3.4 -11.3 -18 -26.5
5 1.3 -18.1 -20.2 -26.5
6 -1.1 -23.9 -22.8 -26.6
7 -2.8 -28.8 -25.6 -26.8
8 -4.2 -33.8 -29.3 -27.8
Table 2: Cross-correlation functions: P&L with GDP.
Results related to US GAAP cases (b) and (c) are not totally unexpected considering what
is stated above. The effect of updating expectations on future losses for older loans in bad times
compensates the fact that during bad times banks grant less loans, creating a situation in which
realized losses net of provisions tend to be higher when GDP is lower.
27However, recall that our baseline assumption does not consider loans that temporarily shift from S1 to S2
and later on, instead of defaulting, recover their S1 status. Rating migrations data show that a non-negligible
amount of rated entities improve their rating every period, which would qualify for an S2 to S1 transition. Thus,
any results regarding the procyclicality induced by S2 loans should be understood as only a lower bound of the
potential, actual effects.
28See, for example, FSF (2009).
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is stated above. The effect of updating expectations on future losses for older loans in bad times
compensates the fact that during bad times banks grant less loans, creating a situation in which
realized losses net of provisions tend to be higher when GDP is lower.
27However, recall that our baseline assumption does not consider loans that temporarily shift from S1 to S2
and later on, instead of defaulting, recover their S1 status. Rating migrations data show that a non-negligible
amount of rated entities improve their rating every period, which would qualify for an S2 to S1 transition. Thus,
any results regarding the procyclicality induced by S2 loans should be understood as only a lower bound of the
potential, actual effects.
28See, for example, FSF (2009).
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5. . Robustness checks
The previous sections have clarified that, in order t calculate the impact on procyclicality, we
were forced to make several assumptions to simplify o r model. Although all the assumptions
are reasonable and in line with regulation, we present a set of robustness checks in order to
understand how results depend on the assumptions.
5.2.1. Allowing for forecast errors in expected losses
Th first assumption that we will challenge is the ability of cre it institutions t perfectly
forecast expected losses up to a one-year horizon. In the alternative setup, 1-year-ahead PDs
across the s mple pan are subject to a stochastic forecast error drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution over the interval (75%, 105%). It is reasonable to assume that, in general, there is
tendency to und restimate the probability of efault more often than being overly cautiou ,
hence the choice of the interval. Introducing such biased noise in the computations results in
lower expected losses, which ultimately entails a reduction of the stock of provisions, as illus-
trated by Figure 9. However, the main conclusion of the paper would not have changed had this
effect been in place.
Profit and Loss (upper panel), stock of provisions (lower panel).
Figure 9: Effect of the inclusion of stochastic forecast errors.
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5.2.2. Ruling out macroeconomic information
The simulations conducted in our baseline specification account for the interaction of default
probabilities with the economic cycle, the latter proxied through the VSTOXX index. In previous
sections, we have pointed out that this feature implicitly introduces some procyclicality in the
calculation of loan losses. Figure 10 plots the cross-correlation functions from Table 1 in the
baseline and “no macro” scenario; it appears that discarding macroeconomic information reduces
the procyclicality of P&L with respect to GDP in both the IFRS 9 and GAAP accounting
regimes, in line with our intuition.
GAAP 1: Future loss rates are known (“perfect forecast”); GAAP 2: Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in
the future, then revert to the sample average; GAAP 3: Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future,
then revert to the average of the previous five years.
Figure 10: Cross-correlation function of P&L and GDP: Effect of macroeconomic information.
Regarding the ultimate impact on provisions, where we also look at the IAS 39 case, Figure
11 illustrates that the shape of the series varies notably; for IFRS 9, in particular, the reduction
in procyclicality can also be observed in the more moderate oscillations in the neighbourhood
of the 2008 recession.
The US GAAP series refers to the perfect forecast case.
Figure 11: Stock of provisions: Effect of macroeconomic information.
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5.2.2. Ruling out macroeconomic information
The simulations conducted in our baseline specification account for the interaction of default
probabilities with the economic cycle, the latter proxied through the VSTOXX index. In previous
sections, we have pointed out that this feature implicitly introduces some procyclicality in the
calculation of loan losses. Figure 10 plots the cross-correlation functions from Table 1 in the
baseline and “no macro” scenario; it appears that discarding macroeconomic information reduces
the procyclicality of P&L with respect to GDP in both the IFRS 9 and GAAP accounting
regimes, in line with our intuition.
GAAP 1: Future loss rates are known (“perfect forecast”); GAAP 2: Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in
the future, then revert to the sample average; GAAP 3: Future loss rates known up to a one-year horizon in the future,
then revert to the average of the previous five years.
Figure 10: Cross-correlation function of P&L and GDP: Effect of macroeconomic information.
Regarding the ultimate impact on provisions, where we also look at the IAS 39 case, Figure
11 illustrates that the shape of the series varies notably; for IFRS 9, in particular, the reduction
in procyclicality can also be observed in the more moderate oscillations in the neighbourhood
of the 2008 recession.
The US GAAP series refers to the perfect forecast case.
Figure 11: Stock of provisions: Effect of macroeconomic information.
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5.2.3. Comparative statics on key parameters
As an additional check on the suitability of our approach, we perform two sensitivity ex-
ercises: Firstly, we gauge the responsiveness of loss given default to different values of the
loan-to-value ratio (LTV in our equations) and the sales ratio SR, that is, the ratio between
the present value of the sale price and the value of the collateral; secondly, we depart from a
loan maturity of 20 years to evaluate the consequences in the profit and loss account and the
stock of provisions.
Starting with loan-to-value ratios, it is straightforward that a higher exposure-to-collateral
value induces greater losses through the LGD identity and, hence, provisions will also increase.
The opposite occurs with the sales ratio: If the (discounted) sale price represents a large share
of the collateral, losses will be more contained and so LGD is decreasing in SR. Figure 12 shows
how loss given default, plotted against the age of the loan, varies for different values of the two
parameters of reference; the effects, as expected, are not linear. In terms of impact on provisions
and the P&L account, we provide the full set of time series for each of the accounting regimes
in the Appendix.
The dashed black line represents the baseline for the simulations.
Figure 12: LGD (%) vs. loan age for selected LTV (left panel) and SR (right panel) values.
Regarding the effects of loan maturity M in our results, we relax the 20-year assumption to
allow for shorter and longer mortgage horizons. The results are plotted in Figures 13 and 14:
longer-term loans imply a larger stock of provisions for all the maturities considered.
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IAS 39 (left panel), IFRS 9 (center panel), US GAAP (right panel).
Figure 13: P&L as a percentage of performing exposure for different loan maturities.
IFRS 9 (left panel), US GAAP (right panel).
Figure 14: Stock of provisions as a percentage of performing exposure for different loan matu-
rities.
5.2.4. A second look at Stage 2 transitions
In our baseline simulations, we link the Stage 1 to Stage 2 transition to the 30-day past
due rebuttable assumption. Exploring the existing literature along with other data sources has
provided us with two alternatives for the modelling of S1↔ S2 transitions.
The work by Abad and Sua´rez (2017) is our first source of inspiration as the authors compute
transition probabilities from S1 to S2 (TR12) and from S2 to S1 (TR21) in expansions and
contractions of the economic cycle. We take the averages in both points to obtain proxies of the
two TRs. With this information, we can calculate the Stage 1 and Stage 2 exposures at default
accounting for migrations within both states:
EADS1t+1 = (1− TR12)× EADS1t + TR21 × EADS2t
EADS2t+1 = (1− TR21)× EADS2t + TR12 × EADS2t
(15)
In this case we obtain TR12 = 5.65% and TR21 = 8.8%.
Besides, the European Central Bank s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)
contains information on late or missed payments on loans and mortgage payments from house-
30
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s an additional check on the suitability of our approach, e perfor t o sensitivity ex-
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loan-to-value ratio ( TV in our equations) and the sales ratio , that is, the ratio bet een
the present value of the sale price and the value of the collateral; secondly, e depart fro a
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stock of provisions.
Starting ith loan-to-value ratios, it is straightfor ard that a higher exposure-to-collateral
value induces greater losses through the identity and, hence, provisions ill also increase.
he opposite occurs ith the sales ratio: If the (discounted) sale price represents a large share
of the collateral, losses ill be ore contained and so is decreasing in S . igure 12 sho s
ho loss given default, plotted against the age of the loan, varies for different values of the t o
para eters of reference; the effects, as expected, are not linear. In ter s of i pact on provisions
and the account, e provide the full set of ti e series for each of the accounting regi es
in the ppendix.
The dashed black line represents the baseline for the si ulations.
igure 12: ( ) vs. loan age for selected T (left panel) and S (right panel) values.
egarding the effects of loan aturity in our results, e relax the 20-year assu ption to
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holds across the euro area. In particular, variable HNC0125 collects the answers to the question
“Thinking of all the various loan or mortgage payments due in the last twelve months: were all
the payments made the way they were scheduled, or were payments on any of the loans some-
times made later or missed?”. The possible answers are: 1 (All payments as scheduled), 2 (It
happened once or more that I was late with or missed some of the payments) and 3 (Household
did not have loans in the last 12 months). We use this variable as a proxy for the transition prob-
ability TR12 with the intuition (and the strong assumption) that impaired repayments imply a
deterioration in the credit quality of the loan:
TRHFCS12 =
∑
(HNC0125 = 2 | Italian household)∑
(Italian household)
=
1274
8156
= 15.62% (16)
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To the best of our knowledge, however, none of the survey variables sheds any light on how
to approximate the transition probability from S2 to S1; therefore, we decide to use the same
value for TR21 than in the previous case.
Both the effect on P&L and the differences in provisioning under the three migration regimes
are shown in Figure 15. While similar in shape, provisions are higher when one allows for loans
switching between Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Profit and Loss (upper panel), stock of provisions (lower panel).
Figure 15: Comparison of different Stage 2 migration assumptions.
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to present an assessment of the procyclicality of credit im-
pairments under various accounting regimes. We elaborate on the recent evolution of financial
instrument accounting systems, namely, IAS 39, IFRS 9 and US GAAP. Under IAS 39, expected
losses stemming from future events cannot be recognized. Consequently, under this accounting
regime financial institutions are required to deal with losses only when a negative turn in the
business cycle is already affecting credit quality.
The recently introduced IFRS 9 and US GAAP mark a paradigm shift from incurred loss
to expected loss but differ in the moment at which expected losses are recognized. While US
GAAP requires the recognition of lifetime losses at origination or purchase of an asset, IFRS
9 only demands to account for the expected losses in the next 12 months as long as the asset
does not show a significant increase in risk, which triggers the recognition of the ECL for the
remaining lifetime.
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We model the impact of credit impairments on P&L under different accounting regimes in an
historical scenario under different assumption on the how financial institutions estimate ECL.
Our results indicate that IFRS 9 is much less procyclical than the previous regulation (IAS 39).
The reason behind it is that under IAS 39 losses are recognized once the write-off takes place
whereas under IFRS 9 losses are recognized one year before default, and default takes place
some time before the write-off (sometimes too early); thus, from that point of view it is a step
in the right direction.
Nevertheless, it presents a substantial degree of procyclicality because, even if financial
institutions had the ability to exactly forecast future losses, their impact would be anticipated by
just one year, and therefore would still be likely to hit financial institutions when a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle is already started. Under US GAAP, since future expected
losses are fully provisioned from inception, the realized impact on P&L instead tends to be
anticipated and smoothed out in time. The US GAAP therefore seems more likely to reduce
the procyclical effects of credit quality deterioration.
However, the level of provisions is much higher under US GAAP than under IFRS 9. There-
fore, the lower procyclicality of US GAAP seems to come at the cost of holding a larger stock
of provisions.
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We model the impact of credit impairments on P&L under different accounting regimes in an
historical scenario under different assumption on the how financial institutions estimate ECL.
Our results indicate that IFRS 9 is much less procyclical than the previous regulation (IAS 39).
The reason behind it is that under IAS 39 losses are recognized once the write-off takes place
whereas under IFRS 9 losses are recognized one year before default, and default takes place
some time before the write-off (sometimes too early); thus, from that point of view it is a step
in the right direction.
Nevertheless, it presents a substantial degree of procyclicality because, even if financial
institutions had the ability to exactly forecast future losses, their impact would be anticipated by
just one year, and therefore would still be likely to hit financial institutions when a contractionary
phase of the credit or business cycle is already started. Under US GAAP, since future expected
losses are fully provisioned from inception, the realized impact on P&L instead tends to be
anticipated and smoothed out in time. The US GAAP therefore seems more likely to reduce
the procyclical effects of credit quality deterioration.
However, the level of provisions is much higher under US GAAP than under IFRS 9. There-
fore, the lower procyclicality of US GAAP seems to come at the cost of holding a larger stock
of provisions.
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A. Robustness checks: Detailed results
Comparative statics on the loan-to-value ratio, LTV
(The black dashed line represents the baseline for our simulations)
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Comparative statics on the sales ratio, SR
(The black dashed line represents the baseline for our simulations)
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Comparative statics on the sales ratio, SR
(The black dashed line represents the baseline for our simulations)
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